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Social networking and social media technologies have greatly changed the way 
information is created and transmitted. Social media has made content contribution an 
efficient approach for individual brand building. With abundant user generated content 
and social networks, content consumers are constantly subject to social influence. Such 
social influence can be further utilized to encourage pro-social behavior. 
Chapter 1 examines the incentives for content contribution in social media. We 
propose that exposure and reputation are the major incentives for contributors. Besides, 
as more and more social media websites offer advertising-revenue sharing with some of 
their contributors, shared revenue provides an extra incentive for contributors who have 
joined revenue-sharing programs. We develop a dynamic structural model to identify a 
contributor’s underlying utility function from observed contribution behavior. We 
recognize the dynamic nature of the content-contribution decision—that contributors are 
forward-looking, anticipating how their decisions impact future rewards. Using data 
collected from YouTube, we show that content contribution is driven by a contributor’s 
desire for exposure, revenue sharing, and reputation and that the contributor makes 
decisions dynamically. 
Chapter 2 examines how social influence impact individuals’ content 
consumption decisions in social network. Specifically, we consider social learning and 
 vii 
network effects as two important mechanisms of social influence, in the context of 
YouTube. Rather than combining both social learning and network effects under the 
umbrella of social contagion or peer influence, we develop a theoretical model and 
empirically identify social learning and network effects separately. Using a unique data 
set from YouTube, we find that both mechanisms have statistically and economically 
significant effects on video views, and which mechanism dominates depends on the 
specific video type. 
Chapter 3 studies incentive mechanism to improve users’ pro-social behavior 
based on social comparison. In particular, we aim to motivate organizations to improve 
Internet security. We propose an approach to increase the incentives for addressing 
security problems through reputation concern and social comparison. Specifically, we 
process existing security vulnerability data, derive explicit relative security performance 
information, and disclose the information as feedback to organizations and the public. To 
test our approach, we conducted a field quasi-experiment for outgoing spam for 1,718 
autonomous systems in eight countries. We found that the treatment group subject to 
information disclosure reduced outgoing spam approximately by 16%. Our results 
suggest that social information and social comparison can be effectively leveraged to 
encourage desirable behavior.  
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Chapter 1:   Content Contribution for Revenue Sharing and 
Reputation in Social Media 
1.1 Introduction 
Social media websites have become extremely popular recently for sharing 
contents, with 48-hour videos uploaded to YouTube every minute, 200 million tweets 
posted on Twitter every day, over 9,000 bloggers contributing on a wide range of topics 
on the Huffington Post every day, and over 6 billion photos shared on Flickr. Many very 
successful contributors have risen above the crowd. Michelle Phan is one such example. 
Starting as a no-name YouTuber in 2008, she has posted almost 200 videos and 
impressed viewers with her creative talent in makeup. She became a YouTube makeup 
sensation and now works for Lancôme as its first video makeup artist. Other people 
whose successes were made possible by their social media appearances include Justin 
Bieber, Jessica Rose, Kate Upton, and Graeme Anthony.  
Although it is evident that social media can provide an alternative success path, 
why people contribute to social media and what they receive from content contribution is 
still under debate. In practice, after AOL purchased the Huffington Post for $315 million 
in 2011, thousands of unpaid bloggers filed a lawsuit against the Huffington Post, 
demanding compensation for their blog posts. However, the Huffington Post insisted that 
the bloggers’ decisions to contribute for free were rational because they earned exposure 
and opportunities in return. Unlike the Huffington Post, certain websites such as 
YouTube, About.com, Break.com, and Epinions.com are paying some users for their 
contributions in the form of advertising-revenue sharing. In academia, few researchers 
have looked into the rationale behind content contribution in social media. Existing 
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studies have found that knowledge contribution is driven by professional reputation, 
interpersonal ties, direct reciprocity, and enjoyment of helping others (Wasko and Faraj 
2005). Investigations of open-source software development also showed that users 
voluntarily work on open-source tasks because of enjoyment of the work, direct need for 
software improvement, and the reputation that follows from making high-quality 
contributions (Fang and Neufeld 2009, Lakhani and Hippel 2003, Lerner and Tirole 
2002). While these studies indicate potential drivers for content contribution, significant 
differences exist between social media and knowledge sharing or open-source software 
communities. In addition, extant research is based mainly on survey results that often 
ignore the dynamic nature of contribution.   
In response to this gap, we develop an empirical framework to analyze the 
incentives for content contribution in social media. Relative to the extant literature, our 
research is distinguished in the following respects. First, we model the monetary payback 
for content contribution explicitly and examine how it motivates the contributors relative 
to other motivations, including exposure and reputation. Second, we allow the 
contributors to be forward-looking or myopic and test which attitude can better explain 
our observations. If contributors are forward-looking when making contributions, they 
would consider both current and future utilities. If they are myopic, they would consider 
only current utilities. Third, we model the changes in exposure and reputation 
dynamically so that current exposure and reputation are allowed to impact future 
exposure and reputation.  
Using data from YouTube, the largest online community for user-generated 
videos, we find that instead of being myopic, contributors are forward looking, taking 
into consideration future benefits when making contribution decisions. Our results show 
that besides exposure, revenue sharing and reputation are two major incentives for 
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content contribution. For contributors who have joined the revenue-sharing program, 
shared revenue has greatly increased their valuation of the views of their contents, which 
determines the advertising-revenue income. We also find it is better to measure a 
contributor’s reputation in terms of relative performance than absolute achievement 
because of competition among contributors.  More specifically, a contributor values 
relative rank among contributors with similar status more than relative rank among all 
contributors. These findings have important implications for both practitioners and 
researchers. 
Our research contributes to the studies on social media in the following ways. 
First, this is one of the first empirical studies to examine and quantify various incentives 
for content contribution. While most empirical studies on social media focus on 
behavioral influences or interactions to determine statistical associations, very few look at 
the underlying incentives that fundamentally define such social behaviors (Manski 2000). 
Second, we use a dynamic structural model to identify the underlying parameters in 
contributors’ utility function, which define their valuations for different incentives. Our 
approach has a number of advantages.  A dynamic structural model allows us to capture 
individual behavior where individuals are forward looking and consider not only the 
current-period benefit of an action but also its future benefits.  The model fits well with 
our research context as contribution decisions to social media impact not only a 
contributor’s current-period utility but also future utilities. Our analysis confirms that 
contributors are indeed forward-looking when making contribution decisions. A dynamic 
structural model also allows us to recover underlying parameters of individual utility 
function from nonexperimental data based on the principle of revealed preference.  The 
identification of the parameters enables counterfactual analysis by simulating the effect 
of changes in the underlying environment (e.g. an increase in revenue-sharing 
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percentage), and to compare the explanatory power of competing theories (Reiss and 
Wolak 2005).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is a review on 
related research. In Section 1.3, we provide an introduction of our research context. 
Section 1.4 describes the data.  Section 1.5 presents the empirical approach with a 
proposed model for content contribution. Section 1.6 estimates the model with data and 
offers the estimation results. Section 1.7 discusses research findings, implications, and 
possible extensions. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Social media, also referred to as user-generated media, are new sources of online 
information created, initiated, circulated, and used by consumers intent on educating each 
other about products, brands, services, personalities, and issues (Dellarocas et al. 2010, 
Goldenberg et al. 2012). Users have both social presence and self-presentation on social-
media platforms. On the one hand, according to social-presence theory (Short et al. 
1976), the higher the social presence, the larger the social influence the communication 
partners have on each other’s behavior. Self-presentation, on the other hand, can be used 
to influence others by controlling the impressions others form of them. In many cases, 
both social presence and self-presentation are used to influence others to gain rewards. 
Zhang and Zhu (2011) further showed the social benefits a contributor receives increase 
with group size. In addition, psychological reasons also help explain individuals’ 
repeated participation in social media. Bateman et al. (2011) found that members might 
have psychological bonds to a community based on need, affect, and obligation. In 
particular, they found need-based commitment predicting thread reading, affect-based 
commitment predicting reply posting and moderating behaviors, and obligation-based 
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commitment predicting only moderating behavior. Ma and Agarwal (2007) found that 
perceived identity verification can promote knowledge contribution.    
Reputation has long been recognized as a key driver of content contribution in 
social media. Reputation could lead to social rewards such as approval, status, and 
respect (Jones et al. 1997). Given the enormous amount of information in social media, 
content consumers often face high levels of information asymmetry and information 
overload. In these situations, they tend to choose content from reputable contributors 
(Dellarocas 2003). Many social-media websites provide specially designed reputation 
mechanisms to facilitate online interactions (Dellarocas 2003, Rice 2012). A 
contributor’s online reputation can also extend to that person’s professional life (Stewart 
2005), as more and more potential employers are taking a job applicant’s online 
reputation into consideration. Thus, reputation is especially important for content 
contributors with career concerns or business motivations (Holmstrom 1999).  However, 
there are no universal measures for reputation. Walker (2012) summarized that, although 
its measures are context specific, reputation is perception based, aggregated, and 
comparative, and that measures for reputation should reflect these three attributes. 
For many social-media websites, reputation alone may not be strong enough to 
motivate content contribution, especially high-quality content contribution. The objective 
of social media websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter is to employ user-
generated content to attract advertisers. Therefore, the market potential of contributed 
contents is important for these websites, whereas it is of lesser concern for the 
contributors. Consequently, many websites offer advertising-revenue sharing with 
contributors to resolve this misalignment in incentives. Besides social media, many other 
industries have also widely adopted revenue sharing to address similar principal-agent 
problems. Extant studies have analyzed the principal-agent problem in a variety of 
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contexts and demonstrate revenue sharing could be an effective incentive mechanism to 
mitigate the problem (e.g., see Atkinson et al. (1988) in the context of a professional 
sports league; Black and Lynch (2004) in the context of workplace innovations; Arthur 
and Jelf (1999) in the context of union-management relations; and Mortimer (2008) in the 
context of business-to-business contract choices).  The principal-agent problem is more 
prominent in online social media, as there exists no contractual relationship between the 
social media website and content contributors, and the quality of content is difficult to 
assess and monitor.  Revenue sharing thus serves as an important strategic tool used by 
social media websites to motivate quality content contribution. 
1.3 Research Context 
We conduct our research based on YouTube, a video-sharing website founded in 
February 2005 by three former PayPal employees: Steve Chen, Chad Hurley, and Jawed 
Karim. The company is based in San Bruno, CA.  In November 2006, Google bought 
YouTube for $1.65 billion, and since then it has operated as a subsidiary of Google. 
Ranked as the top online video website, YouTube allows billions of people to discover, 
watch, and share originally created videos. As of August 2011, it had drawn in 3.5 billion 
viewing sessions from 162 million unique viewers. Monetization of these views resulted 
in over $240 million of advertising revenue during 2010, according to Multichannel.com.  
Wall Street experts estimated that YouTube generated over $1.1 billion in annual revenue 
for Google in 2011.  
Both unregistered and registered users can watch videos on YouTube, but only 
registered users can upload their videos. Registration is free and can be done in seconds. 
Each registered user has a unique YouTube page, called a YouTube channel. The channel 
presents a user’s profile information, uploaded videos, and recent activities.  Most videos 
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on the website are generated by individual users. The uploaded videos can be up to 15 
minutes in length, and that limit can be increased through account verification using a 
mobile phone. The videos’ purposes can be entertaining, informational, or tutorial. The 
major video categories include auto and vehicles, comedy, education, entertainment, film 
and animation, gaming, how-to and style, news and politics, nonprofits and activism, 
people and blogs, pets and animals, science and technology, sports, and travel and events. 
Besides presenting information about the video contributor, a YouTube channel also 
allows viewers to subscribe to the contributor so they can get immediate notifications of 
new video postings. In this respect, subscribers can be considered loyal viewers of the 
contributor’s videos. Although YouTube is a social broadcasting website, contributors 
can set their content to be private, or they can give only specific users permission to view. 
This kind of behavior is driven by a contributor’s need to connect to or share with 
specific viewers. The specific incentive is beyond the scope of this study, and we do not 
consider such behavior as content contribution in this research.  
YouTube makes money out of advertising with and within videos and channels. 
The ads can take the forms of standard video, expandable video, inVideo, inStream, rich 
media, and banner. YouTube enables inVideo ads only with partners and shares 
advertising revenue with them. To become a YouTube partner and obtain revenue sharing 
from video views, a contributor must regularly upload videos that are original and can 
generate thousands of views. A contributor can also publish extremely popular or 
commercially successful videos to apply for partial partnership on those specific videos 
only.  YouTube does not publish specific requirements for partnership though, and 
reserves the right to make the final decisions. 
YouTube is representative of other social-media websites and reflects a future 
trend in social media with respect to monetization of contents. Like YouTube, many 
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social-media websites strive to monetize their content and user bases. Over 100 websites 
offer advertising-revenue sharing to their content contributors. For example, at 
About.com, Guides—who create contents to help users—are paid according to increase 
in page views in addition to a base payment, guaranteed to be $675 per month in the first 
two years and a minimum of $500 per month afterward.  Shareapic.net pays its users 
$0.22 per 1,000 picture views. Epinions.com gives its users Eroyalties credits for writing 
reviews, and these credits are redeemable for U.S. dollars. Break.com pays its 
contributors up to $2,000 if their videos are selected to be posted on the homepage. The 
rewards from revenue sharing have made content contribution a full-time profession for 
many contributors. Therefore, what we study in the context of YouTube applies to these 
websites as well as other websites considering monetization. Our study helps the 
management of these social-media websites to gain a deep understanding of their 
contributors’ valuations of exposure, monetary payback, and reputation. Such insight 
informs the design of incentive mechanisms such as whether revenue sharing is necessary 
to motivate contributions, how contributions change with shared revenue, and how many 
contributors to share revenue with. 
1.4 Empirical Approach 
This research aims to explore incentives for content contribution, including 
revenue sharing and reputation as well as intrinsic value from exposure. Therefore, our 
model needs to capture contributors’ valuations of these factors. Although we do not 
observe their payoffs from revenue sharing or reputation directly, contributors’ valuations 
can be inferred from changes in their contribution behavior according to the principle of 
revealed preference (Blundell et al. 2003). 
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1.4.1 Current-Period Utility Function 
A contributor’s current-period utility is influenced by four major factors: 1) 
exposure in the current period;  2) shared advertising revenue if the contributor is 
participating in revenue sharing; 3) accumulated reputation that may bring in 
psychological benefits such as the warm glow of doing something good,  or potential 
economic benefits such as sponsorship, investment, or career opportunities  in the current 
period; and 4) contribution costs that include the actual costs for producing1  and posting 
videos and opportunity costs.  
We model the current-period utility of exposure as a function of new views ( ) 
and new subscribers ( ) gained in the current period.  New views and new subscribers 
refer to the number of video views and the number of new subscribers obtained in a given 
time period, respectively. We calculate new views and new subscribers from total views 
( ) and total subscribers ( ) in two adjacent periods. Therefore, the intrinsic utility from 
increased exposure (  ) for contributor   in period   can be written as 
   
              ,      (1.1) 
where              , and              .   
Currently, on most social-media websites, not all contributors can share 
advertising revenue generated by their content. For example, About.com pays Guides 
only for their written content, and Break.com pays only contributors whose videos are 
selected to be posted on its homepage. YouTube is no exception, with revenue sharing 
limited to partners. We model the partnership status using a binary variable     where 
    {
                                      
           
      (1.2) 
                                                 
1 For many top contributors, production and posting decisions are separate and our analysis focuses on their 
posting decisions. For these contributors, production costs are sunken cost when they make posting 
decisions.  Therefore, production costs are not part of contribution costs for these contributors.   
 10 
Shared revenue depends on the views a partner’s videos generate for the 
advertisements embedded in these videos. Although it is almost impossible (except for 
YouTube) to get the exact number of advertisement views, that figure is highly correlated 
with video views. Therefore, we measure the utility from revenue sharing (  ) using an 
interaction term of partnership status and new views: 
   
                  (1.3) 
where    measures the increased utility from new views because of revenue sharing. 
A contributor’s reputation may bring in many side opportunities such as 
investments, grants, sponsorship, and job offers. It also creates psychological benefits 
such as the warm-glow that makes a contributor feel good. Unlike revenue sharing, which 
has only a short-term impact on the contributor’s utility, reputation is accumulated over 
time and has a long-lasting effect. Many studies suggest that reputation is a relative 
concept based on comparison with competitors or industry benchmark (Horner 2002).  In 
social media, reputation has two aspects. One is popularity, which can be measured by 
total views ( ). The other is quality, which can be approximated by total subscribers ( ). 
One common criticism YouTube often receives is that it has too many funny or weird 
videos, which attract many viewers even though the videos are of very low quality. While 
it is not unusual for these videos to get many viewers, it is unlikely that these viewers 
would subscribe to the contributors’ channels. One viral YouTube video, “Lily's 
Disneyland Surprise,” received over 8 million views and made the contributor a fortune, 
but it only generated less than 2,000 subscribers for the contributor’s channel. In this 
study, we use the rank of total views (  ) and the rank of total subscribers (  ) among 
all contributors to measure a contributor’s reputation. Using ranks instead of absolute 
numbers also captures the competition on YouTube, or on social media in general, so that 
a contributor’s reputation is not only determined by the contributor’s achievement but 
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also influenced by comparing the contributor’s reputation with other contributors’ 
performance.  The utility from reputation (  ) can thus be expressed as follows: 
   
        
 
    
   
 
    
.     (1.4) 
Since rank is an inverse measure of reputation, with a lower rank number meaning a 
higher reputation, we use the reciprocal of rank to keep a positive correlation between 
reputation and utility, and make coefficients    and    positive.  
There is a certain cost associated with contribution, such as getting the video 
ready, adjusting the video to be consistent with YouTube requirements, and posting the 
video onto the YouTube channel. We assume that contribution cost (C) occurs only with 
actual contribution. For contributors who have their videos ready long before their 
posting decisions, the cost of producing video is sunk costs and the contribution costs 
thus include only costs related to the action of posting.  So we have    
                   {
                     
                 
                        (1.5) 
with    measuring the average contribution cost2. 
Meanwhile, a contributor’s utility is affected by many other factors, such as the 
time availability, comments about previously uploaded videos, news and hot topics, and 
video-making capability.  Unfortunately, such factors are unobservable to researchers. So 
we add an error term     in utility function, which can be considered as the random utility 
shock in each period. The error term is allowed to be option specific (Arcidiacono and 
Miller 2011, Arellano 2000, Berry et al. 1995, Rust 1987), representing different 
unobservables for different options. We use            to model the component of utility 
                                                 
2 The heterogeneity in contribution cost is absorbed in the random utility shocks. But since we cannot 
observe or measure the heterogeneity separately from the shocks, we cannot compare its magnitude with 
contribution benefits, or compare the heterogeneities of different provider groups.   
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of option     in time   which is known by the contributor but not by the researchers. 
       captures unobserved utility for not contributing anything in period  .        
captures unobserved utility for making a contribution in period  . Both        and        
are assumed to be Type I extreme values that are independent and identically distributed 
(        across   and  . This assumption is commonly made to generate a Logit model for 
choice probabilities (Arcidiacono and Miller 2011, Arellano 2000, Rust 1987). The above 
discussion suggests that the current-period utility a contributor   receives in period t can 
be expressed as  
                           
 
    
   
 
    
               ,     (1.6) 
1.4.2 Forecasting and Dynamic Transition 
As we discussed above, the video provider makes a decision on a video-posting 
action (   ) in each period. It is not realistic, however, to consider each of these decisions 
separately in each period since the influence of each decision would extend into the 
future. Specifically, different actions in the current period would lead to different 
numbers of new views, new subscribers, and reputations in the next period, and hence 
might result in different actions taken in the next period. Therefore, we characterize the 
provider’s decisions in all periods as a sequential decision problem where a sequence of 
decisions must be made, with each decision affecting future decisions.  In this dynamic 
setting, we need to model how contributors predict future states given their contribution 
decisions. The constructive procedure used for solving such problems is dynamic 
programming (Rust 1994). One important concept of dynamic programming is state 
variables, whose values completely specify the instantaneous situation of the process. 
The decisions influence total utilities by affecting change in state variables. Therefore, 
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the state variables should include the variables influenced by the contributor’s decisions, 
and thus influence the contributor’s utility. According to (1.6), the state variables of our 
model should include at least             ,     , and     , which determine current-period 
utility.  
Contributors facing decision problems would anticipate the outcomes of choosing 
different actions (Manski 2000). The outcomes include changes in state variables and 
resulting utilities in future periods. According to Manski (2000), contributors forming 
expectations may seek to draw lessons from observations of the actions chosen and 
outcomes experienced both by themselves and others. Consequently, we model the 
contributor’s expectation of the change in state variables using the pattern discovered 
empirically from observed data.  
The changes of             ,     , and      over time are influenced by the 
provider’s actions as well as other factors.   The transition of     can be considered as a 
product-diffusion process, where the product is the contributor’s YouTube channel. The 
most widely used new-product growth model is the Bass diffusion model (1969), which 
considers both mass media and interpersonal communication channels. The central 
proposition of the Bass diffusion model implies that  
                              ,                                  (1.7) 
where   represents potential market size,      is the number of new adopters at time  , 
     is cumulative number of adopters at time  , and   and   are coefficients for 
innovation and imitation. This model has been widely used in forecasting consumer 
demand. Based on this form of the Bass diffusion model, we model the transition of       
as a function of     and    
 . In the specific context of YouTube, however, the increase in a 
contributor’s channel subscribers also depends on the increase in a contributor’s video 
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views because new subscribers have to be generated out of new viewers. So we include 
      to capture the conversion from viewers into subscribers. We also expect to observe 
a reputation effect by which contributors with higher reputations can attract more new 
subscribers. Thus the reputation measures      and      may impact      . Some factors 
that also influence the evolution of new subscribers are specific to the provider, resulting 
in different evolution paths for different providers. These factors are unobservable to 
researchers. For example, better-looking providers in the videos may attract more viewers 
to subscribe to their channels. We denote such provider-specific variables as   .  
                          
                   
     
 
    
    
 
    
   . (1.8) 
Although providers can anticipate the expected value of       based on the 
diffusion path we described above (in (1.8), where E(.) denotes expectation), they do not 
have the perfect knowledge of the realization of      . The uncertainty lies in many 
aspects, such as competition from other channels or websites, ease of subscription, and 
exogenous change in total viewer base. It is thus impossible for providers to know the 
actual       beforehand. We assume that the realized       follows a normal distribution 
with mean           as in (1.8) and variance   
 . The uncertainty is summarized in a 
random subscription shock      . So we have 
                       
                   
     
 
    
    
 
    
           
            
  .      (1.9) 
The expected new views       is essentially the aggregation of the diffusion 
processes of all contributors’ videos. Existing studies have shown that the Bass diffusion 
model also applies to the demand for a product category and for individual brands (Ma 
and Agarwal 2007). Moreover, Hendricks and Sorensen (2000) demonstrated that a 
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strong spillover effect exists among sales of music albums by the same artist.  They find 
that the release of an artist’s new album increases the sales of that same artist’s old 
albums, especially if the new release is a hit, and vice versa. As a result, we assume that 
the Bass diffusion model also applies to the transition of      . What makes the process 
different from the traditional diffusion process is that YouTube’s subscription function 
makes it very convenient for subscribers to check out new videos. Therefore,     and 
       are included to capture two different impacts of total subscribers on increased 
views. While     captures new views for the contributor’s existing contents,        
captures new views from existing subscribers if the contributor posts new videos.  
Essentially,    measures the herding effect caused by the existing subscriber base, and    
measures the degree of loyalty of existing subscribers. 
                          
                      
 
    
    
 
    
     (1.10) 
Similar to the evolution of expected      , we also include reputation effect from 
     and     , and a contributor-specific effect (  ). Because of the uncertainty of 
realized      , the evolution of      is also a stochastic process in which       follows a 
normal distribution with mean          as in (1.10) and variance   
 . The random view 
shock is denoted as      . So we have  
                       
                      
 
    
    
 
    
           
       (    
 )  (1.11) 
A contributor’s reputation presumably is highly correlated over time and 
endogenous so that it changes according to the contributor’s performance in each period. 
In this study, we use relative ranks in video views and subscribers as measures for 
reputation to emphasize competition among contributors. Therefore, the uncertainties 
come from the unpredictable performance of all other contributors.  According to 
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knowledge-capital models (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu 2008, Griliches 2000), we 
consider both reputation in video views and reputation in subscribers to be governed by a 
first-order Markov process that 
                                              
       (1.12) 
                                                    
  . 
Theoretically, as video views and subscribers increase, the probability of a 
provider becoming a YouTube partner increases as well. YouTube can also terminate a 
provider’s partnership if the provider is not in compliance with YouTube’s terms of 
service. However, in reality, we don’t observe any instance of a partner becoming a 
nonpartner. So we assume that once becoming a partner, the provider would remain a 
partner for all future periods. Therefore, we assume the probability of being a partner in 
the next period is conditional on current partnership status such that 
            {
                                                                       
                                         
   (1.13) 
To focus on an optimal Markovian decision rule where each contributor’s action 
depends only on the current state (Rust 1987, 1994), we need to include all variables in 
the current period that influences future utilities either directly or indirectly in the state 
variables. So  state variables (       ) are constructed to include    ,    ,   , and   , as well 
as     ,    ,    ,     ,     , and      as in (1.14).     and     are updated determinately 
simply by adding the increase to the existing cumulative number.    and    are constant 
over time. 
                                                             .                  (1.14) 
The dynamic transition process can be described as 
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                                                                (1.15) 
            {
                                                                             
                                         
               
                
                
             
             
where        (    
 )        (    
 )             
    and             
  . 
Although   , and    are unobservable to researchers, they can be recovered from 
the data using panel-data methods (Bajari 2007). Because the evolution paths of      , 
     ,       ,       , and       are stochastic processes, we denote the Markov transition 
density for a state variable           when action     is chosen as 
              |            , representing the provider’s subjective beliefs about an 
uncertain future state according to (1.15).     consists of variables observable either 
directly or indirectly by recovering them from other observables. 
1.4.3 Markov Decision Process 
Because of the uncertainties in realized next-period state variables, providers do 
not have perfect knowledge about future state variables when they make contribution 
decisions in each period. Although they are able to anticipate the expected values of 
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future state variables, the actual values depend on the realized      ,      ,       and       
that occur after the contribution decision has been completely carried out. As a result, the 
contributor’s decisions can change the state variables only probabilistically. The 
contributor’s goal is to maximize the expected total utilities from all future periods, given 
the current state variables. We model these contributors as forward-looking instead of 
myopic because most of the contribution benefits are realized several periods after the 
contribution.  Dynamic structural models have been used to capture the forward-looking 
feature of content contribution in social media. A dynamic structural model assumes that 
when making the decisions, contributors not only consider current-period utility but also 
take into account the discounted expected future utilities over an infinite time horizon. 
Therefore, the objective function can be described as 
        ∑  
    
      (                |                )                     (1.16) 
where   is the common discount factor. The myopia case is also included in the model 
simply by setting    . (1.16) dynamically models a contributor's maximization 
problem, given the contributor’s expectation of future utilities based on current state 
variables.   
In each period, the contributor observes current-period state variables, makes a 
decision based on this information, and realizes current-period utility. In the next period, 
the state variables update and are revealed to the contributor, who then makes another 
decision based on the new state. We assume the contributor makes a decision at the end 
of each period. The model is equivalent, however, if the decision is made at the beginning 
of each period. The detailed decision process can be described as follows.  
In period t 
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 First, a contributor observes the value of that contributor’s current-state 
variables                                                 and believes these 
variables evolve according to 1.15.  
 Second, because of uncertainties in      ,      ,      ,       and      , the 
contributor forms expectations of            ,       ,        and       in period 
t+1. The provider has two available options:               Since     influences 
     ,       influences      , and       and       influence        and       , 
two options lead to different values of current-period utility     and different 
expected values of       in the next period. For each option, the contributor 
considers what to choose in the next period if the contributor is in the resulting 
new state          with one fewer period remaining, and calculates expected 
utility from the next period, and so on.  
 Eventually, the contributor adds up the discounted expected utilities from all 
future periods and current-period utility for each option, chooses the one that 
generates higher total utilities, and acts upon the chosen    . Meanwhile, the 
contribution cost is realized if      . 
In period t+1 
 The contributor observes realized      ,      ,             , and      . The state 
evolves to realized                                                           , 
which may be different from the provider’s anticipation. Again, the contributor 
makes another decision of       based on information of       and imperfect 
knowledge about state evolution (1.15). 
Given the setup of our model, we have an infinite-horizon, discounted Markovian 
decision problem, the solution of which is given by a stationary decision rule     
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           such that the contributor’s optimal decision is a function of state variables. The 
optimal value function    is a unique solution to the Bellman equation given by       
                                                                 |                    
(1.17) 
where                   |                   
∫ ∫                  (             |                )
          
 
and the optimal decision rule is defined by  
                 
         
[                                        |                 ] 
(1.18) 
To simplify the numerical integration required in the Bellman equation (1.17), a 
conditional independence assumption is adopted from existing dynamic programming 
literature (Aguirreagabiria and Mira 2002, Holmstrom 1999, Rice 2012) such that  
  (           |                )          |                |                  (1.19) 
This conditional independence assumption allows us to simulate state evolution 
and random shock generation separately. Taking the standard approach for dynamic 
structural modeling, we set   to be constant (Aguirreagabiria and Mira 2007, Bajari et al. 
2007), equal to 0.97. The reason for not being able to identify   is explained in detail in 
Section 6.2. However, we test the forward-looking model where         against the 
myopic model where    .   is the set of all the parameters to be estimated, and 
                      is the vector of structural parameters in the utility function. 
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1.5 Data 
1.51 Data Collection 
We collect a panel of data on two different groups of YouTube contributors for 
two months from January 9th, 2012, to March 10th, 2012. Set 1 includes the top 1,000 
contributors of the most viewed YouTube channels in June 2011, while Set 2 consists of 
2,236 new contributors who joined YouTube during January 2012.  
The key decision a contributor makes in online social media is timing—when and 
how frequently to contribute content.  To operationalize the decision process, we consider 
each contributor’s decision in a given period.  For parsimony, we treat multiple video 
postings in each period as one posting. Therefore, action in each period is whether a 
contributor posts any new videos. We define time period as one day and collect data 
daily. We choose a short time period because most YouTube videos have an extremely 
brief lifetime. Figure 1.1 plots the growth in views several sample videos received after 
being posted on YouTube and the average curves. The figure shows most videos received 
the greatest number of views in the first four to five days. After that time, views increased 
only marginally. We also collect information on two key statistics published by YouTube 
on the popularity of each contributor: 1) total video views (     , which counts the number 
of times a contributor’s videos have been viewed, and 2) total subscribers (    , which 
counts the number of viewers who have subscribed to the contributor’s channel.  For 
reputation measure, we collect data from vidstatsx.com on 1) video view rank (    ), the 
provider’s rank among all contributors in terms of cumulative video views, and 2) 
subscriber rank (    ), the provider’s rank among all contributors in terms of total 
subscribers. Because vidstatsx.com provides ranks only for the top 9,999 contributors, we 
record any missing rank as 10,000. For partnership status, we check YouTube pages for 
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each contributor’s videos. If any video has any inVideo ads, we treat the contributor as a 
partner (     ), and otherwise as a nonpartner (     ). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Cumulative Views of Sample Videos by Top Providers (top) and New 
Providers (bottom) after Being Posted 
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We collect data daily from YouTube and vidstatsx.com.  For both groups, we 
delete the samples with missing values or no video postings during the data-collection 
period. The data-cleaning process reduced the sample size to 823 for Set 1 of the top 
contributors, and to 1252 for Set 2 of new contributors. For simplification, we refer to Set 
1 as top sample set and to Set 2 as new sample set.  While all the top contributors were 
partners during the data-collection period, all the new providers were nonpartners at the 
beginning, with 438 becoming partners and 814 remaining nonpartners during the period. 
We allow the size for a new sample set to be slightly larger than for a top sample set so 
we can get balanced partner versus nonpartner observations, since some new contributors 
became partners in between. In the estimation, we pool all the samples together as well as 
estimate partners and nonpartners separately. Figure 1.2 plots the distribution of the 
number of videos posted by sample providers during the data-collection period. It shows 
that top and new contributors posted a similar number of videos.  
 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Number of New Videos Posted 
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1.5.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the two sample sets. The statistics show 
that the two sets vary greatly from each other in terms of number of views, number of 
subscribers, views rank, subscribers rank, video-posting probability, partnership status, 
and number of videos. The top sample set accumulates far more video views, channel 
subscribers, and videos, and thus has a higher ranking in terms of video views and 
subscribers. The new sample set posts videos more frequently though, and some new 
contributors post even more videos (2,782) than the most productive contributor (with 
989 videos posted) in the top sample set. While all the top providers are YouTube 
partners, most contributors in the new sample set are nonpartners. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Top sample set 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
video views 159,696,110 360,497,854 3,919,009 6,911,122,609 
subscribers 364,196 493,522 12,294 5,297,145 
views rank 4,631 4,196 1 10,000 
subscribers rank 1,566 2,305 1 10,000 
action ( ) 0.1302 0.3366 0 1 
partnership (P) 1 0 1 1 
videos 213 217 1 989 
sample size 823 
 New sample set 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
video views 180,821 863,195 0 23,045,802 
subscribers 417 2,629 46 75,592 
views rank 9,984 223 3,761 10,000 
subscribers rank 9,980 341 1,949 10,000 
action ( ) 0.2019 0.4015 0 1 
partnership (P) 0.1988 0.3991 0 1 
videos 38 105 0 2,782 
sample size 1,252 
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The distribution of views and subscribers across contributors for the two sets are 
presented in Figures 1.3–1.6 (left). Data for both new sample sets are highly skewed. 
Therefore, we use the log transformation of views and subscribers to control for skewness 
in the data (Susarla et al. 2012). Figures 1.3–1.6 (right) plot the log-transformed views 
and subscribers. In the rest of the chapter,   and   refer to log-transformed total 
subscribers and video views, and   and v refer to the change in the log-transformed new 
subscribers and new views. Table 1.2 shows the summary of the key variables used in our 
estimation for the two sets pooled together. 
 
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Views (left) and ln(views) (right) for Top Sample Set 
 
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Views (left) and ln(views) (right) for New Sample Set 
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Subscribers (left) and ln(subscribers) for Top Sample Set 
 
Figure 1.6: Distribution of Subscribers (left) and ln(subscribers) for New Sample Set 
Table 1.2: Key Variable Summary 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
    0.0102 0.0381 0 4.9457 
    0.0060 0.0253 -1.1235 3.1761 
     6,994 4,115 1 10,000 
     5,450 4,524 1 10,000 
    14.1365 4.5411 0 22.6564 
    8.8167 3.6701 0 15.4807 
    0.6153 0.4865 0 1 
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1.5.3 Censored Data on Reputation 
Since vidstatsx.com provides ranking data for only the top 10,000, we can 
observe the rank in total video views or total subscribers only if it is in the top 10,000. 
Because we do not observe views rank    and subscribers rank    if they are beyond 
10,000, we set the unobserved rank to be 10,000. Therefore, the observed-rank data for 
video views and subscribers     
  and     
  are 
    
                    and      
                  .  (1.20) 
To solve this data-censoring problem, we use a Tobit model (Wooldridge 2002) to 
recover the unobservable      and      that are beyond 10,000. Our censored Tobit 
model assumes that      given     and      given     follow normal distributions that 
                           |          
             (21) 
                          |          
    
We use maximum likelihood to estimate    and     and recover the value of      
and      before we start estimating our dynamic structural model. The results are 
reported in Table 1.3. The summary for recovered uncensored values, which are used for 
structural-model estimation later, is presented in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Censored Tobi Model 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
      
     (constant)   35548.48 (71.4041)*** 
           
 -1850.25 (3.9860)*** 
Log likelihood -334687.57 
      
      (constant)   46374.72 (264.3245)*** 
           
 -2244.64 (14.6134)*** 
Log likelihood -396394.52 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
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Table 1.4: Summary of Uncensored Ranks 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
     13,855 11,042 1 46,374 
     7,285 6,532 1 16,222 
1.6 Estimation 
1.6.1 Two-Stage Estimation Procedure 
The two-stage estimation procedure and conditional-choice-probabilities (CCP) 
based estimator was first proposed by Hotz and Miller (1993). In the two-stage 
procedure, the first step is to estimate the parameters for choice and transition 
probabilities. The second step then takes the choices and transition probabilities as givens 
and estimates the structural parameters in the utility function. Aguirregabiria and Mira 
(2007), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), Bajari et al. (2007), and Pakes et al. (2007) 
developed different estimation methods based on the one proposed by Hotz and Miller 
(1993). We choose to follow the one suggested by Bajari et al. (2007) because it can deal 
with continuous-state variables directly without discretization and it is computationally 
parsimonious compared to other estimation methods. 
Let             denote the choice-specific value function excluding the private 
shock         , which is the expected lifelong utility of choosing     today and resorting 
to optimal choices in all future periods.             can be expressed as 
                                           |                            (1.22) 
We assume that a contributor’s decision is influenced only by that contributor’s 
own state variables, not by the state variables of other contributors. Although interaction 
and competition generally exist in social media, it is extremely difficult to solve for the 
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equilibrium if interaction and competition are included, given the infinite number of 
contributors. In this study, we use relative ranking to control for the impact of 
competition. With these notations, contributor   would optimally choose       if 
                                                        (1.23) 
We define the policy function (the decision rule for contributors)        as a 
mapping from state variables to a binary choice.  Since         and          are Type I 
extreme values, which turns our optimization problem into a logit model, we can recover 
the choice-specific value functions by inverting the observed conditional choice 
probabilities at each state (Hotz and Miller 1993) so that 
                      (    |    )    (    |    )                       (1.24) 
(1.23) is used in the first stage of estimation to derive the optimal decision rule.  
Recall that our state variables include video views and subscribers, which gives us 
a relatively large state space. In this case, a state-by-state inversion approach is likely to 
generate very noisy estimates of the policy functions. Bajari et al. (2007) suggested that 
for continuous states, the choice-specific value functions              can be modeled as 
flexibly parameterized functions of the action and state variables.  
To summarize, the two-stage estimation method can be described as follows. In 
the first stage, we use fixed effects, OLS, and logit estimations to recover the video 
contributors' policy functions       ,  the parameters ( s,   
 ,   
 ,   
 , and   
 ), and the 
fixed effects    and   . We use the second stage to estimate the structural parameters ( s) 
that rationalize the contributors' contribution behaviors (   and   ). In this stage, we use 
forward simulation to derive the minimum-distance estimator that minimizes violations 
of the optimality conditions (Bajari et al. 2007, Hotz and Miller 199). A single simulated 
path can be obtained as follows: 
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1) Starting at observed state          , draw private shocks          from 
extreme value distribution for each contributor  . 
2) Given the policy function        estimated in the first-stage estimation, 
calculate the optimal action    
  given     and the resulting current-period utility 
           
         
   . 
3) Draw a vector of error terms for      ,      ,      , and       from the 
corresponding normal distribution, and calculate the resulting new state     
using the estimated state-transition parameters. 
4) Repeat steps 1–3 for each simulated period. 
Subsampling is used to calculate standard errors for structural parameters. 
Averaging contributor i’s discounted sum of utilities over all simulated paths yields an 
estimate of           for any policy function         including  
      , which is the 
optimal decision rule derived from first-stage estimation. Because the policy function 
from the first stage is supposed to be the optimal policy, the following inequality should 
be satisfied at the true values of structural parameters   : 
         
              
                                      (1.25) 
The estimator  ̂ minimizes the objective function below: 
 ̂         (
 
 
∑               
             )                                (1.26) 
Although the asymptotic theory requires the simulated time span     to drive the 
simulation error to zero, in practice we can use a finite number of   as long as    is 
relatively small. Given that       , we set        in the simulation. 
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1.6.2 Identification 
Before we estimate the model, we want to provide some intuition for which 
features of the data allow us to identify particular parameters of the model. The 
discussion also highlights the assumptions essential for identification. With a panel of 
observations on new views ( ), new subscribers ( ), total views ( ), total subscribers ( ), 
contribution actions ( ), partnership status ( ), views rank (  ), and subscribers rank 
(  ), and the functional form assumptions (Equation (15)) for state transition, the 
parameters for state transition ( s) can be identified. Once the parameters for state 
transition ( s) are identified, the error terms (     ,      ,      , and      ) can be 
estimated and then their variance (  
 ,   
 ,   
 , and   
 ) can be identified.  
The common discount factor   cannot be identified because   is highly collinear 
with the cost parameter   . Changing   leads to negligible changes in the value function 
and estimates of   . Both lowering   and raising    can decrease the expected value of 
contribution and induce the choice of no posting (     ).  For example, consider a 
brand new contributor without any views, subscribers, partnership, or reputation as a 
simple example. For this contributor, the current-period utility for contributing is    , 
and 0 for not contributing. The expected value function for a new state resulting from 
contributing (denoted as    ) is likely to be higher than that for a new state resulting 
from not contributing (denoted as    ). According to (1.22), the total utility for 
contributing is                , and the total utility for not contributing is      
      . The difference between the two options is                       
      . The choice probability is then determined jointly by   and   . Therefore,   and 
   cannot be separately identified from observed contribution behavior. So we take   as 
known and set it to be 0.97 for forward-looking contributors. We also test the forward-
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looking assumption against the myopic case where     to determine which fits our 
data better.  
Because we do not observe any data on contribution payoffs or costs, we can 
identify the structural parameters only up to scale. So we normalize the contribution cost 
   to be 1 and estimate other parameters (              ) in proportion to   . The 
variation in observed-choice probabilities for contributors with different 
                         , and     allows us to identify              and   . For example, 
imagine two contributors with the same state variable except for    . Because of the way 
we construct our state-transition process (i.e.,     does not impact state transition), two 
contributors would form the same expectation for the next-period state variables and thus 
the same value function for the next period. As   is given, the different choice 
probabilities are determined by different    . So    can be identified from the different 
choice probabilities for the two contributors. Similar interpretations can be drawn for 
identifying         , and   . 
1.6.3 Results 
Our main results presented in this section are derived on two sample sets pooled 
together. In the next section for robustness check, we also provide the results from 
estimation on partner sample and nonpartner sample observations separately. The first 
step in the two-stage estimation procedure is fixed-effects estimations to derive the 
parameters for transitions of    , OLS regressions for    and   , a logit regression for   
(if    =0), and another logit regression to derive conditional-choice probabilities 
    |    .  
Table 1.5 presents results of the fixed-effects estimations. All parameters are 
significant. Contrary to what we would expect from a Bass diffusion model,     has a 
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negative impact on      . So we have       decreasing as     increases, indicating no 
herding on total views in choosing contributors. We also find that the number of total 
subscribers     has a strong positive impact on new views, indicating herding on total 
subscribers in choosing contributors. These two findings together suggest total 
subscribers can be more influential than total video views for a contributor’s popularity. 
Since we use log transformation for these variables, we can interpret the coefficient on     
as that 1-percent increase in number of total subscribers would lead to a 0.0367-percent 
increase in number of new views. This impact is slightly stronger when the contributor 
posts a new video, so that a 1-percent increase in number of total subscribers would lead 
to a 0.0375 (=0.0372+0.0003)-percent increase in number of new views. While the 
increase in new views caused by        is statistically significant though, the magnitude 
of this interaction effect is very small, indicating low loyalty of existing subscribers. We 
also find significant reputation effects from views rank and subscribers rank, with the 
effect of views rank slightly stronger than that of subscribers rank. 
Similar to the relationship between     and      ,       decreases with     as well, 
indicating no herding in viewers’ subscription decisions. However,       has a strong 
impact on      , suggesting that the more viewers a contributor’s videos attract, the more 
subscribers those viewers can be converted to. The negative coefficient (  ) on      
  
further shows that the conversion rate from viewers to subscribers decreases as       
increases. Reputation effect caused by high views rank has a much stronger impact by 
high subscribers rank. To summarize, these results imply that although viewers herd on 
contributors with more subscribers when choosing videos to watch, no herding is 
observed when they make subscription decisions, and that viewers tend to watch videos 
from and subscribe to providers with high reputations. 
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Table 1.5: Fixed Effects Estimates for       and       
Transition of       Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
     (constant)  0.6379 (0.00361)*** 
            -0.0314 (0.00027)*** 
         
   -0.0023 (0.00001)*** 
          
 0.0372 (0.00023)*** 
              0.0003 (0.00003)*** 
             
 0.1808 (0.00415)*** 
             
 0.1566 (000379)*** 
  
  0.00064 
R
2
 37.68% 
Transition of        
      (constant)  0.6072 (0.00486)*** 
            -0.0345 (0.00034)*** 
          
   -0.0032 (0.00002)*** 
             
  0.3180 (0.00413)*** 
            
   -0.1112 (0.00279)*** 
             
 0.3739 (0.00445)*** 
             
 0.2238 (0.00371)*** 
  
  0.00046 
R
2
 32.23% 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
 
Table 1.6 shows the OLS regression results for        and  . Views rank and 
subscribers rank are both highly correlated with rank in the previous period. New views 
and new subscribers can improve the contributor’s ranking in views and subscribers. On 
average, a 1-percent increase in       can improve views rank by 2,082, while a 1-percent 
increase in       can improve subscribers rank by 1,757. For nonpartners, increases in 
both       and       can increase the chances of becoming partners, but an increase in 
      can increase the chance by more than the same increase in      . 
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Table 1.6: OLS Estimates for        and        and Logit Estimates for       
Update of        Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
      (constant)      -72.162 (2.5493)*** 
            
       1.0021 (0.00016)*** 
            
       -2082.3. (54.412)*** 
  
  201369 
 
R
2
 99.84% 
Update of         
      (constant)          1.9001 (0.21012)*** 
                      0.9998 (0.00002)*** 
                      -1756.8 (5.62460)*** 
  
  1471 
 
R
2
 99.99% 
        |         
      (constant)       -6.8546 (0.33553)*** 
             
       0.1280 (0.02845)*** 
             
       0.2481 (0.05787)*** 
Log likelihood -1676 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
 
For conditional-choice probabilities, we use logit regression of contributors’ 
actions on state variables. The results are presented in Table 1.7.  These estimates are 
used to calculate the empirical probabilities of     |     and     |     at each state, 
which are further used to derive the optimal-decision rules based on (1.23) and (1.24).  
In the second stage, we estimate structural parameters in the utility function (αs). 
The coefficient on contribution cost    is normalized to be 1, and other parameters are 
estimated relative to   . Results are presented in Table 1.8.    and    measure 
contributors’ valuations of new views and new subscribers, respectively.    measures 
contributors’ additional valuation for new views because of revenue sharing.    and    
measure contributors’ valuations of reputation in video views and subscribers, 
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respectively. We test the forward-looking model, where          against the myopic 
model, where    , and find the data reject the hypothesis that contributors behave as 
myopic decision makers: The dynamic model with        produces a statistically 
significant improvement in ability of the model to fit the data. 
Table 1.7: Logit Estimates for Conditional Choice Probabilities 
    |         
 
Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
        11.9470 (0.73697)*** 
         5.6445 (0.77343)*** 
    0.0620 (0.04388) 
         -0.3901 (0.07079)*** 
            -0.00001 (0.000007)** 
            0.00005 (0.00002)*** 
           0.64779 (0.04185)*** 
      -1.1107 (0.43982)** 
        4.9745 (0.57017)*** 
Constant -0.1034 (0.78716) 
Percent correctly predicted 87.21% 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
Table 1.8: Structural Estimates for Utility Function 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
                  
            1.0363 (0.04452)*** 1.0075 (0.02661)*** 
           1.1110 (0.08394)*** 1.0180 (0.06946)*** 
              0.9684 (0.02891)*** 1.0125 (0.01663)*** 
                 0.9513 (0.10689)*** 1.0212 (0.07315)*** 
              1.1005 (0.03833)*** 1.0321 (0.05096)*** 
              1 (normalized) 1 (normalized) 
Objective function 52.2342 47.4523 
 Myopia test:      vs.        
LR type statistic 9.5638*** 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
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According to the structural estimates with       , we can see    ,    ,       , 
    , and      all have significant impacts on the contributor’s utility. Among the two 
exposure measures, new subscribers can bring in slightly more utility for a contributor 
than new views. However, this difference is not statistically significant (Table 1.9). If the 
contributor is able to earn advertising revenue, new views can bring in monetary payment 
as well as exposure. In this case, new views give the contributor almost twice the utility 
(1.0075 + 1.0125 = 2.0200) generated by new subscribers (1.0180). Among the two 
reputation measures, results show a contributor’s reputation in terms of video views can 
bring in slightly more benefits (1.0321) than that in terms of subscribers (1.0212). This 
difference, however, is not significant (Table 1.9), indicating that reputations in both 
views and subscribers have a similar importance for contributors.  
Table 1.9: Test on Results from        
Conjecture F statistics  
      0.0197 
      0.0094 
Note: Insignificant statistics means that the conjecture is supported. 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
 
Compared to these benefits, the relative contribution cost is still high. For 
example, for a contributor with average    ,    ,     ,      at sample mean (0.0102, 
0.0060, 13855, 7285), and no partnership, the average current-period benefit is 0.0166, 
far from enough for covering contribution cost (fixed as 1). This finding also proves that 
a forward-looking assumption can better justify most contributors’ behaviors than can a 
myopic one. 
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1.6.4 Partners vs. Nonpartners 
The structural estimates in Table 1.8 are based on the assumption that partners 
and nonpartners have the same state-transition process. In this section, we test whether 
the results will still hold if we allow partners and nonpartners to have different state-
transition parameters and form different expectations for state variables in the next 
period. Since we estimate the models for partners and nonpartners separately, we drop the 
variables for partnership status     and revenue sharing       . The additional valuation 
for     as a result of revenue sharing should be reflected as the difference between the 
coefficients for     (    for partners and nonpartners. Table 1.10 below presents a 
comparison of key variables for partners and nonpartners. It shows that although partners 
have accumulated more total views and subscribers, these nonpartner new providers grow 
faster with more new views and subscribers.  
Table 1.10: Key Variables Summary for Partners vs. Nonpartners 
 Nonpartners Partners 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
    0.0201 0.0544 0 4.9457 0.0040 0.0203 0 2.4264 
    0.0114 0.0380 -1.1235 3.1761 0.0026 0.0102 -0.0408 0.4212 
    * 25082 4706 5901 46375 6837 7502 1 36274 
    * 14188 1482 2640 16222 2970 4422 1 16184 
    9.4839 2.0902 0 16.3629 17.0618 2.9257 4.4998 22.6564 
    4.9770 0.8355 3.8286 10.9436 11.2269 2.5236 3.8501 15.4827 
* Recovered from censored data. 
 
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 present results from the first-stage estimation for state 
transition. Overall, nonpartners and partners experience quite different state-transition 
processes. For the transition of      , we find that the coefficient estimates for     and    
  
for nonpartners have opposite signs from those for partners. Given the range of     for 
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both sets,       decreases as     increases for partners, whereas it first increases and then 
decreases as     increases for nonpartners. We find similar results on     and    
  for the 
transition of      . For nonpartners, views rank has a much stronger positive impact on 
both new views and new subscribers, while subscribers rank has no significant impact. In 
fact, we find that subscribers rank has positive impact only on increased views for 
partners. The explanation for this finding is that as a new contributor gets popular, views 
rank has a decreasing reputation effect, whereas subscribers rank has an increasing 
reputation effect. These results overall are consistent with the results for two sets pooling 
together, although the coefficient magnitudes are quite different between the two sets. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the transitions of        and       .  
Structural estimates for partners and nonpartners are presented in Table 1.13.  The 
results show the estimate of    to be significantly higher for partners than for 
nonpartners, confirming that     generates more benefits for partners because of revenue 
sharing. For nonpartners, reputation in terms of video views is more important than 
reputation in terms of subscribers. However, it is the opposite for partners that views rank 
does not have a significant impact on their utilities but subscribers rank does. This 
finding suggests that for established top providers, attracting more views can no longer 
bring in reputational benefits if these views cannot generate new subscribers.  
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Table 1.11: Fixed Effects Estimates for       and        for Partners vs. Nonpartners 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Nonpartners Partners 
Transition of         
     (constant) 0.0940 (0.00642)*** 0.5515 (0.02588)*** 
            0.0277 (0.00110)*** 
-0.0577 (0.00366)*** 
 
         
   -0.0070 (0.00009)*** 0.0006 (0.00016)*** 
          
 0.0565 (0.00079)*** 0.0229 (0.00245)*** 
              0.0027 (0.00015)*** 0.0001 (0.00002)*** 
             
 1447.3 (565.30)*** 0.0067 (0.00222)*** 
             
 -320.67 (328.11) 0.0130 (0.00204)*** 
  
  0.001379 0.000186 
R
2
 31.55% 49.93% 
Transition of         
      (constant) -0.6823 (0.01152)*** 0.7816 (0.01230)*** 
            0.2796 (0.00401)*** -0.1149 (0.00246)*** 
          
   -0.0342 (0.00047)*** 0.0038 (0.00014)*** 
             
 0.3643 (0.00715)*** 0.2377 (0.00438)*** 
            
   -0.1259 (0.00497)*** -0.0922 (0.00251)*** 
             
 5942.4 (354.97)*** 0.1109 (0.01734)*** 
             
 -1147.2 (1312.43) -0.0189 (0.03148) 
  
  0.001068 0.000064 
R
2
 32.19% 50.26% 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
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Table 1.12: OLS Estimates for        and        for Partners vs. Nonpartners 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Nonpartners Partners 
Update of          
      (constant) -4.5366 (0.6212)*** -63.578 (3.3782)*** 
            
 1.0002 (0.00002)*** 0.9988 (0.00038)*** 
 
            
 -2223.6 (2.4088)*** -1589.0 (146.19)*** 
  
  306.02 314837 
R
2
 99.99% 99.43% 
Update of          
      (constant) -1.6691 (0.09475)*** 2.0665 (0.26953)*** 
             1.0001 (0.00001)*** 0.9997 (0.00005)*** 
              -1763.8 (0.2462)*** -1692.9 (21.243)*** 
  
  2.4963 2304.89 
R
2
 99.99% 99.99% 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
 
Table 1.13: Structural Estimates for Partners and Nonpartners 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Nonpartners Partners 
            1.0457 (0.01263)*** 2.6046 (0.55316)*** 
           0.9263 (0.03782)*** 1.1378 (0.07739)*** 
                 1.6855 (0.24219)*** 1.4318 (0.91940) 
              0.9122 (0.09717)*** 0.8004 (0.08537)*** 
              1 (normalized) 1 (normalized) 
   0.97 (fixed) 0.97 (fixed) 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
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1.6.5 Alternative Ranking 
In this section, we check the robustness of our main results in Table 8 relative to 
the alternative-ranking method.  We use the ranking among the sample contributors 
instead of among all YouTube contributors. This test approximates the condition that 
contributors are compared only to contributors with a similar status. The results from the 
first-stage estimation for       and       show no significant reputation effects from 
       and       , in terms of attracting viewers and subscribers, so we exclude        
and        in predicting       and      . Coefficients on other variables are consistent 
with the main results shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. So we present only the structural-
estimation results in Table 1.14, which also includes results using rank data among all 
contributors (Table 1.8) for comparison.  According to Table 1.14, results using rank 
among sample contributors are consistent overall with results using rank among all 
contributors. Using rank among sample contributors generates higher coefficients for 
both reputation measures, however, indicating that relative position in comparison to 
similar contributors may be more important than relative position in comparison to all 
other contributors in general. 
Table 1.14: Structural Estimates Using Different Rankings 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Rank among sample contributors Rank among all contributors 
            0.9932 (0.03950)*** 1.0075 (0.02661)*** 
           1.0132 (0.05752)*** 1.0180 (0.06946)*** 
              0.9784 (0.07519)*** 1.0125 (0.01663)*** 
                 1.1559 (0.06781)*** 1.0212 (0.07315)*** 
              1.0663 (0.02817)*** 1.0321 (0.05096)*** 
              1 (normalized) 1 (normalized) 
   0.97 (fixed) 0.97 (fixed) 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
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1.6.6 Alternative Reputation Measures 
In this section, we check the robustness of our main results in Table 1.8 to 
alternative reputation measures.  We use absolute performance measured by total views 
and total subscribers, instead of relative performance measured by views rank and 
subscribers rank, to test how sensitive our estimates are to different reputation measures. 
The comparison of structural estimation results is presented in Table 1.15. According to 
Table 1.15, if we use total views and total subscribers as measures for reputation,    ,     
and        no longer have significant impacts on the contributor’s utility, suggesting we 
are not able to disentangle incentives from exposure, revenue sharing, and reputation.  
Table 1.15: Structural Estimates Using Different Reputation Measures 
 Parameter estimates (standard errors) 
 Reputation measured by 
views and subscribers 
Reputation measured by views rank 
and subscribers rank 
            0.4880 (1.38873) 1.0075 (0.02661)*** 
           3.0034 (12.83798) 1.0180 (0.06946)*** 
              0.2949 (1.36969) 1.0125 (0.01663)*** 
                 45.67 (0.67024)*** 1.0212 (0.07315)*** 
              4.7181 (2.54160)* 1.0321 (0.05096)*** 
              1 (normalized) 1 (normalized) 
   0.97 (fixed) 0.97 (fixed) 
*** p = 0.01; ** p = 0.05; * p = 0.10 
1.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
As more and more social media websites introduce revenue sharing as an 
incentive for content contribution, it is important to understand the effect of this 
mechanism. It is necessary to recognize that, besides this direct monetary incentive, 
contributors also receive attention and build reputation in social media. Contributions to 
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and promotions in social media have become successful alternatives to customary career 
or business paths. For example, traditionally businesses needed to pay for advertising in 
mass media such as expensive TV commercials. With social media, however, they can 
create a YouTube channel, Twitter account, or blog to advertise their products or 
services. The advantages of using social media include lower costs and more frequent 
interaction with customers. However, how successful businesses or individuals can be 
using social media depends on whether they can effectively build their reputations. 
Therefore, it is essential to understand how reputation in social media is measured and 
how contributors value their reputations.   
Based on existing theories of revenue sharing, reputation, and content 
contribution, we develop a dynamic structural model to identify content contributors’ 
utility function through their content-contribution decisions, using YouTube as the 
research context. Recovering structural parameters in utility function enables us to study 
the underlying incentives that fundamentally determine contributors’ contribution 
behaviors. Using a data set from YouTube on 823 top contributors and 1,252 newly 
registered contributors, we find the following results. First, content contribution in social 
media is driven by contributors’ desires for exposure and reputation. Revenue sharing 
provides an extra incentive for contributors who join the revenue-sharing program. 
Second, we prove that content contribution can be better explained by dynamic, forward-
looking decision making in which contributors anticipate future benefits as well as 
immediate rewards. The main advantage of a dynamic structural model is not the 
estimation of the parameters, but the structural framework for decision making that 
enables evaluation of counterfactual changes in the environment. Oftentimes, the 
platform owner is not interested in predicting contribution given current partner program 
and payment schedule, but interested in what would happen if the program requirements 
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and payment schedule change.  Our analysis provides a useful tool to the platform owner 
for such analyses.   Third, it is more appropriate to measure reputation in terms of relative 
performance than absolute achievement because of the competition effect among all 
contributors. Comparing with other contributors of similar status is more important than 
simply comparing with all contributors in general. Fourth, established top contributors 
enjoy more reputation benefits only if they can attract more subscribers than their 
competitors. Attracting more viewers can no longer bring in reputation benefits for top 
contributors if they cannot convert these viewers into subscribers. This result is consistent 
with the finding that when choosing videos, viewers tend to herd on contributors who 
have more subscribers rather than those with more views. We also show that no herding 
exists when viewers choose contributors to subscribe to, suggesting that subscription 
reflects matching between a contributor’s videos and a subscriber’s preference. 
Therefore, subscribers rank can better reflect the reputation of a popular contributor than 
viewers rank.  
Our results have important implications for practitioners and researchers in social 
media. First, revenue sharing and reputation can both be used to motivate content 
contribution, especially for video-content contribution, which is costly for contributors. 
For popular contributors, reputation benefits are brought in by subscribers rank but not by 
viewers rank. Without revenue sharing, these contributors would be more interested in 
building loyal subscribers and reputation in terms of subscribers than attracting general 
viewers. However, this may not be consistent with the platform owner’s interest to 
generate more engagement for advertising. Revenue sharing can motivate contributors to 
attract general viewers and to cater to advertisers’ interests.  For websites that do not 
offer revenue sharing, the capability to provide a powerful platform for contributors 
could still attract contributors pursuing recognition and reputation. Besides revenue 
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sharing, YouTube has so many contributors also because it is the most influential video-
sharing website in the world. The Huffington Post and Twitter are not paying any 
contributors but still have large contributor bases. Second, motivating contributors with 
potential future rewards is important. In fact, we have already seen such examples in 
practice. In 2010, YouTube had a $5-million-grant program for “new and emerging 
YouTube partners.” It also holds various contests from time to time. Break.com has the 
policy that contributors get paid if their videos are posted on the front page.  Such 
possible rewards to come are necessary for mitigating high contribution costs today, 
which can induce high-quality content. Third, websites can emphasize contributors’ 
reputations by comparing contributors to each other. More importantly, websites can 
identify groups of similar contributors with comparable popularities and content interests 
to provide ranking for different groups. Such specific comparison is more useful for 
encouraging content contribution than general comparison. In addition, social-media 
websites should give more weight to subscriptions than to views so they can make better 
recommendations. 
1.8 Future Research 
The analysis carried out in this research can be extended along a number of 
dimensions. First, we consider only the aggregate viewership for all contributors’ videos. 
Distribution of views across videos may also have an impact on the contributor’s utility 
though. For instance, a single hit video might be more valuable than several average 
ones. Data at the video level are necessary to carry out a more detailed analysis. Second, 
we simplify the contribution decision to be a binary choice between contributing or not, 
while in reality the decision is much more complex. A contributor needs to choose the 
quantity and quality of the content to contribute as well.  Another simplification is that, 
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due to data availability, we only consider the contributor’s decision on posting videos but 
not producing videos.  In reality, a contributor makes two sequential decisions, first 
determine whether it will be worthwhile to produce a video for potential distribution 
through social media sites and second determine when will be the optimal time to post 
the video once the video is produced.  The two sequential decisions are clearly dependent 
on each other.  It will be worthwhile for future research to analyze the two decisions 
jointly.  Third, we measure reputation using both ranks among all contributors and ranks 
among contributors with similar popularities in this research. It could be more 
meaningful to use ranks among contributors working on similar topics.  More 
importantly, our operationalization of reputation using rank measures is a relatively crude 
approach.  Reputation, by its nature, is latent and contains multiple dimensions.  
Incorporating other dimensions of reputation such as viewer ratings and related WOM 
measures could help improve the model.   While our preliminary analysis using a subset 
of the data with video rating data indicates that rating has no significant impact on 
viewership or subscription, a better understanding and modeling of reputation in online 
social media will be an interesting topic for future search.   Finally, we do not look into 
the details of viewers’ choices of videos and channels, which could shed light on the 
dynamics of content contribution and competition between channels. These limitations 
provide exciting opportunities for future research. 
 48 
Chapter 2:   Distinguishing Social Learning from Network 
Effects in Social Media 
2.1 Introduction 
With new products such as consumer goods, food, pharmaceutical goods, 
financial services, and movies constantly flooding the markets, consumers face an 
already overwhelmingly large and rapidly growing choice set. Meanwhile, with the 
prolific use of social media, consumers obtain information about products from social 
sources in the forms of product reviews and friends’ recommendations. Therefore, 
marketers tend to use these forms of social contagion to influence consumers’ perception 
and behavior.  
Several studies have shown the presence of social contagion in new product 
adoption (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Goldenberg et al. 2009; Iyengar, Van den Bulte, 
and Valente 2011). We aim to take a step further to test different mechanisms of social 
contagion: How individuals’ decisions are affected by peers? In our context, social 
contagion happens mainly through two channels: (1) Social learning, the process in 
which consumers obtain knowledge about a product’s quality through peers; (2) Network 
effect, the phenomenon that the value of a product increases as the number of its users 
increases. Which mechanism exists or dominates depends on the specific product in 
question. When choosing a mobile network operator, network effects may dominate 
because of free mobile-to-mobile calling. When purchasing an HDTV, social learning 
becomes the primary force because consumers are mainly concerned about the quality. 
These two mechanisms have different implications for marketing strategies: For products 
with strong network effects, creating a large user base is crucial in attracting new 
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adopters, while for products with prevailing social learning, generating positive word-of-
mouth (WOM) is the key.  
In this study, we differentiate between social learning and network effects in the 
context of YouTube, the largest online video sharing website. Choosing online videos to 
watch is one of the most common choices viewers make every day. Given the vast 
reservoir of online videos, how to choose videos to watch can become a complicated 
issue. On the one hand, consumers receive various information from friends and infer 
video quality through social learning. On the other hand, frequent social sharing creates 
direct or indirect network effects where a video becomes a fad. For example, when a 
video goes viral, users have strong incentives to watch it so they have something to 
discuss in social encounters. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework of Social Learning and Network Effects 
Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of our study. Most existing studies on 
social contagion focus on the Manski problem (Manski 1993): distinguishing general 
social contagion from homophily - the tendency of individuals to associate with similar 
others (Aral et al. 2009, Aral and Walker 2011). Few of them differentiate between the 
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two mechanisms of social contagion: social learning and network effects. Social learning 
affects consumers through the quality information conveyed by peers, whereas the 
network effects influence consumers according to the size of the user base. Although 
these mechanisms lead to similar empirical outcome, their implications are vastly 
different. If social contagion is generated mainly by network effects, then seeding 
strategies, which determine the initial set of targeted consumers, would by implication 
have a strong influence on the success of viral marketing. Ho et al. (2012) show that a 
firm can amplify social contagion and accelerate product purchases by offering 
introductory discounts. However, if social learning is the dominant effect, seeding would 
not be effective unless the initial consumers generate positive word-of-mouth. Qiu and 
Whinston (2012) demonstrate that consumers can infer that the high demand of their 
peers is caused by the introductory discount rather than the high product quality. Both 
cases are theoretically plausible and need to be empirically distinguished. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to disentangle social learning 
and network effects in the context of online video sharing. Because of the lack of pre-
release marketing effort, these two types of social contagion are particularly important for 
user-generated content (UGC). Our empirical results suggest that both mechanisms 
through which social contagion works are important. We further find that social learning 
is more pronounced when consumers are less certain about video quality, and videos with 
attention grabbing content bring on higher network effects. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) 
examine the incentives of a firm to offer low quality products as “pure attention 
grabbers.” Our study confirms their theoretical results: attention grabbers provoke 
discussions and go viral through network effects. The implications derived from studying 
YouTube can carry over to other consumer choice problems as well.  
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review related literature in 
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we outline an analytical model that motivates our empirical 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the YouTube data. In Section 2.5, we present the 
identification strategy and empirical results. Some applications are explored in Section 
2.6. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Manski (1993) discuss an econometric challenge of identifying social contagion: 
Is a person’s behavior caused by his social reference group, or does it simply reflect the 
same movement in his reference group? The observation that individuals belonging to the 
same group tend to behave similarly might result from social contagion, exogenous 
contextual effects, or homophily3.  Failure to account for contextual effects or homophily 
might lead to an overestimation of the effect of social contagion.  
These confounding effects are difficult to distinguish, and the identification of 
social contagion often requires strong parametric assumption or rich data collection. Aral, 
Muchnik, and Sundararajan (2009) distinguish influence-based contagion from 
homophily-driven diffusion using a dynamic matched sample of global instant messaging 
users. Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente (2011) distinguish social contagion from 
homophily and exogenous contextual effects in prescribing behavior among networks of 
doctors.  
Within the framework of social contagion, studies have been focusing on 
distinguishing social learning from other contagion mechanisms such as saliency effect 
                                                 
3 Among these three effects, only social contagion can generate “social multiplier” with a positive feedback 
(Manski 1993). 
 
 52 
(i.e., observed choices are more salient than alternative choices), conformity concerns 
(i.e., the social pressure to adopt the choice made by the majority), and network effects.4  
Although some studies provide evidence of the existence of social contagion in the 
diffusion of UGC, none of them look into the two specific contagion mechanisms, social 
learning and network effects, each of which may have different managerial implications.5  
Using a diffusion model for YouTube videos, Susarla et al. (2011) demonstrate that 
social networks affect economic outcomes by structuring the information available to 
other users, which influences their decisions, perceptions, and behaviors. Goldenberg et 
al. (2012) show that the stream of people’s chatter from social broadcasting networks 
facilitates social learning among a much broader peer group than has traditionally been 
possible. Liu-Thompkins and Rogerson (2012) identify three factors that affect the 
diffusion outcomes of YouTube videos: network structure, content characteristics, and 
author characteristics.  
For UGC, understanding whether the popularity of the content makes it valuable 
(network effects) or the value of the content makes it popular (social learning) is pivotal. 
By distinguishing between network effects and social learning, our study contributes to 
the understanding of different social contagion mechanisms in the diffusion of UGC. 
                                                 
4 Cai, et al. (2009) use a field experiment to distinguish observational learning from saliency effect. Van 
den Bulte and Stremersch (2004) study different social contagion mechanisms using a meta-analysis of 
publications on new product diffusion and find evidence for status concerns and social-normative pressures 
but not for social learning under uncertainty. Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Choi (2012) differentiated 
between social learning and normative influence in the adoption of a new drug. 
5 Online WOM, especially online user reviews, has become an important channel of social learning for 
consumers, which directly affects their behavior. Duan et al. (2009) characterize the WOM process of the 
movie industry through a dynamic simultaneous equation system. Using online book reviews from 
Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) find that an improvement in reviews 
for a book at one site leads to a relative increase in its sale at that site. Goldenberg, Libai, and Muller 
(2010) separate network effects from WOM learning using empirical evidence in the growth of fax 
machines, CB radios, CD players, DVD players, and cellular service. Moretti (2011) shows that social 
learning is a more important determinant of sales in the movie industry than network effects. 
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2.3 A Theoretical Framework of Social Learning and Network Effects 
on YouTube 
A video can go viral either because of social learning or network effects. This 
section examines different implications of the two mechanisms. 
2.3.1 A Model of Social Learning on YouTube 
YouTube videos are experience goods whose quality cannot be fully observed by 
consumers ex ante, but can be ascertained upon consumption. Therefore, before 
consumption, consumers are never completely sure about the quality, but they can always 
acquire useful information from friends who have already watched the videos. Banerjee 
(1992) examines the social learning that occurs through observing other people’s 
behaviors. Our approach is somewhat different. We capture the learning process with a 
Bayesian learning model, where each consumer receives feedback from peers and 
updates the prior belief of the video quality.6 We extend the observational learning 
literature by adding underlying social networks. People make inferences about the quality 
of a video according to the information within their social networks. Because consumers 
on YouTube face a large and growing choice set, we assume that they have limited 
information about a video’s existence.7 The probability that a consumer watches a video 
is the product of two probabilities: the probability that he is aware of the video and the 
probability of watching the video conditional on being aware of the video. Figure 2.2 
shows the timeline. We focus on the information updating process at time 1 and time 2. 
The process proceeds in the same way at time 3, 4, …, T. 
                                                 
6 Following Banerjee (1992) and Moretti (2011), the timing of consumption is exogenously given, and we do not 
consider the strategically behavior of delaying the decision making process to obtain more feedback.  
7 As of August 2012, on average, about 72 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute, and the 
number is still growing, see http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics.  
 54 
We first describe the decision process of conditioning on that they are aware of 
the existence of the video. The utility that a representative consumer   obtains from 
watching some YouTube video   is 
                (      )  
where    is the latent quality of the video, and     represents the unobserved taste 
heterogeneity. This video is published on YouTube at time 1. Individuals share a 
common prior on the quality of the video, given by 
    (  
        )  
where    is a vector of the observable characteristics of video   before watching.   
   is 
the ex-ante expectation of quality, and     is the precision of prior for video  .  
 
Figure 2.2: Timeline 
Before making a decision, each consumer observes a conditionally independent 
private signal of the quality: 
                             (3.1) 
where     is the precision of consumer  ’s information source for video  . The signal 
errors     are independent across consumers. Consumers update the prior according to 
Bayes’ rule.       |    represents consumer  ’s expected utility of video   at time   given 
 55 
the information set at time t,   . Notice that the video is newly published, so no social 
learning occurs at time 1. Conditional on being aware of video  , a consumer chooses to 
watch it if the ex-ante expected utility is no less than the opportunity cost of watching 
video  ,    . Therefore, if a consumer is aware of video   at time  , then he watches video 
  if  
      |    
   
       
  
   
   
       
         
Accordingly, the probability that a consumer watches video   at time 1 is: 
     (      |       )   
(
 
 
   
       
  
   
   
       
      
√    (       )
 
)
 
 
  
where     is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution.  
Then we need to model the probability that a consumer is aware of video   at time 
1, denoted as   .    is a function of the characteristics of video   at time 1, such as the 
video ratings, the number of YouTube Favorites, and the number of video comments. The 
proportion of informed consumers for video   at time 1 is given by:        . Given a 
large number of viewers on YouTube8, the number of views of video   at time 1 is 
                       
where   is the number of potential consumers.  
With social learning, consumers have more information at time 2 because they 
receive feedback from friends. The underlying social network         is given by a 
finite set of nodes              and a set of links      . Each node represents a 
                                                 
8 Over 800 million unique users visit YouTube each month, see http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics. 
According to the law of large numbers, we can calculate the number of video views. If the number of 
potential consumers is not sufficiently large, Chebyshev's inequality can give us a bound of views.  
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consumer. The social connections between the consumers are described by an    
matrix denoted by            such that: 
    {
             
           
   
Let                   represent the set of friends of consumer  . We 
assume that consumer i has k friends, where         . Among them,    friends have 
watched the video at time 1. These friends communicate to consumer i their ex-post 
utilities after watching the video,    , where m =1, 2, 3, ... ,  .    friends were aware of 
the video, but decided not to watch the video at time 1, and they are indexed by m=    
 ,     , ... ,      . The friends that have decided not to watch the video also provide 
valuable information: their expected utilities are less than the opportunity cost of 
watching the video. The number of friends who were unaware of the video at time 1 is 
       . 
As a result, at time 2, consumer i's information set consists of the ex-post utilities 
of some friends, the number of friends who decided not to watch the video, and the 
number of friends who were unaware of the video. Combining these three pieces of 
information, consumer i estimates the quality by maximizing the likelihood of the 
observed evidence: 
  [                             |  ] 
     
   (   )         
       (  [   |  ]     )      
                   
          
where  (   ) is the likelihood of observing    . The maximum likelihood estimator, 
    , is an estimate of   . It is unbiased and asymptotically normal: 
      (        )  
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where       [(
    
   
)
 
] (Amemiya 1973).  
If a consumer is aware of video   at time 2, his expected utility becomes the 
weighted average of the prior mean, his private signal, and the maximum likelihood 
estimator: 
      |    
   
           
  
   
   
           
    
   
           
      
Note that as time goes on, consumers put less weight on the prior mean. Because 
consumers receive more information at time 2, the prior becomes a less important factor 
in the decision making process. The probability that consumer   watches video   at time   
is: 
     (      |       )   
(
 
 
   
           
  
   
       
           
      
√(       )  (           )
 
)
 
 
  
If a consumer is aware of video   at time  , the decision making process proceeds 
in the same way. Consumer   has    friends who decide to watch the video at time  ,    
friends who decide not to watch the video at time  , and         friends who are 
unaware of the video, where              . The probability that consumer   
watches video   at time   is: 
     (      |       )   [
    
               
  
]  
where    √(    ∑    
 
   )  (        ∑    
 
   )
 
, and    
   
        
∑    
 
   
. The 
proportion of informed consumers at time   is given by:     =                   . 
The number of views of video   at time   is: 
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                      ,                         (2.2) 
where      . 
A few remarks need to be made here. In the process of social learning,    is the 
weight that consumers put on the ex-ante prior. It is evident that    decreases with  . As 
time   grows, the probability of watching videos relies less on the ex-ante prior and more 
on social learning. If the revealed quality of the video is higher than the mean of the ex-
ante prior,      
  , we call it a positive surprise. If the revealed quality of the video is 
lower than the prior mean,      
  , we call it a negative surprise. Social learning is a 
process of adjusting beliefs about the quality. Thus, we have the following proposition:  
Proposition 2.1. In the presence of social learning, if a positive surprise is sufficiently 
large (     
  ), then    is increasing in  . If a negative surprise is sufficiently large 
(  
     ), then    is decreasing in  .  
The intuition is straightforward. In our model, consumers learn about the surprise 
over time, and a positive surprise increases the expected quality of the video as time goes 
by. Therefore, the probability of watching the video increases. Similarly, a negative 
surprise reduces the expected quality over time, and the probability of watching the video 
decreases.  
Other things being equal, we consider some video   with a large positive surprise 
and some video    with a large negative surprise. According to (2.2), we find that: 
                                              9 
Therefore, we have the following testable hypothesis from the theoretical 
prediction:  
                                                 
9 The logarithm growth rates are widely used in economic modeling and empirical study. They are good 
approximations for percentage growth rates. 
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Hypothesis 2.1. In the presence of social learning, the growth rate of views of a video 
that has a positive surprise is higher than the growth rate of views of a video that has a 
negative surprise. 
In our model of social learning, we can also consider the impact of the 
consumers’ prior. The intuition is that social learning is more important when consumers 
have more diffuse priors. 
Proposition 2.2. (a) If the positive surprise is sufficiently large,        , is 
decreasing in the precision of the prior,    . (b) Similarly, if the negative surprise is 
sufficiently large,            is decreasing in    .  
The incremental probability,        , can measure the effect of social 
learning. This proposition shows that the effect of social learning is more pronounced for 
videos with less precise priors. If a consumer is very uncertain about the quality of a 
video, the value of social learning is large: The additional information he learns from his 
friends should be more valuable than the case when he knows the quality precisely. An 
increase in the precision of the prior makes the additional information from friends less 
valuable. Thus, social learning should be more valuable among videos that are less 
familiar to consumers, and we have the following empirically testable hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2.2. In the presence of social learning, the positive surprise has a greater 
impact on videos with less precise priors.  
2.3.2 A Model of Network Effects on YouTube 
Social contagion can be driven by either social learning or network effects. 
Network effects in our context mean that the utility of watching a video directly depends 
on the number of consumers who have watched the video, irrespective of their reasons 
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for the choice of watching the video. Both social learning and network effects can be 
recognized as a form of causal social contagion. However, their underlying mechanisms 
are different. The essence of network effects is payoff externality, which implies that the 
value of the service depends directly on the consumption choices made by some other 
consumers. For example, a consumer might enjoy discussing a video with his peers. In 
this case, the actions of other consumers do not convey any quality information about the 
video. Social learning is a different form of causal social contagion, which focuses more 
on information externality instead of payoff externality. In the presence of social 
learning, consumers make inferences about the quality of a video by observing other 
people’s choices and comments. They care about the actions of others only because they 
can receive information about the quality from the peers.  
We modify the theoretical model of social learning to introduce network effects 
and assume that the utility consumer   obtains from watching YouTube video   at time T 
is given by: 
             ∑               
   
   
       (      )  
where                is the number of consumers who have watched the video at time 
t. The consumer derives utility from the total number of consumers who have watched 
the video. The parameter   measures the impact of network effects. If    , then 
network effects exist. If    , then the impact of network effects is insignificant. For 
pure network effects model, we assume no social learning, and, consequently, consumers 
do not receive feedback from peers.  
Under network effects, the probability that a consumer watches video   at time t is 
given by: 
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It is evident that    is increasing in T under network effects no matter what the 
values of   
    and    are.  
One way to empirically identify network effects is to examine sequential 
correlation in video views such that the views at time t is positively correlated with the 
lagged cumulative video view,               . However, we would not be able to 
uniquely identify network effects without controlling for social learning. To achieve this 
goal, we perform a two-stage test. In the first stage, we test whether social learning exists. 
Recall that in Hypothesis 2.1, with social learning, a video with a positive surprise has a 
higher growth rate than a video with a negative surprise. However, under network effects, 
a significant difference in the growth rates resulting from surprises would be absent. 
Therefore, if the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 2.1, then it would show the 
existence of social learning. If Hypothesis 2.2 is also confirmed, it would provide 
additional evidence for social learning. 
In the second stage, we test whether network effects exist using instrumental 
variable as a source of exogenous variation for existing levels of views. If social 
contagion is purely driven by social learning, the growth rate of video views should 
remain unchanged when the surprise does not reflect information about video quality. It 
is because consumers learn nothing from the surprise that does not contain any quality 
information. However, in the presence of network effects, a negative surprise changes the 
viewer base (the number of consumers who have already watched the video), and thus 
lead to a lower growth rate of video views. Through examining Hypothesis 2.3, we can 
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provide the evidence of the existence of network effects. We will describe the two-stage 
test in more detail in Section 2.5. 
Hypothesis 2.3. In the presence of network effects, the negative surprise lowers the 
growth rate of video views even if the negative surprise does not reflect information 
about video quality. 
2.4 Data 
To empirically test the theoretical model, we focus on new videos that were 
posted during our data collection period. As the world’s largest video viewing and 
sharing website, YouTube has enormous numbers of videos, which makes it infeasible to 
select a random sample set of videos. Instead, we focus on the most active providers by 
selecting the top 1,000 YouTube providers (in terms of total video views) identified for 
June 2011.10 We collect a daily panel of data on these providers for one month, from 
March 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012. Our sample includes a total of 302 new videos 
published on March 1, 2012, by these top providers. We use one day as the time unit of 
analysis to capture the fast-changing nature of online videos. 
The provider level data include provider ID, data collection date, date when the 
provider joined YouTube, number of subscribers to the provider’s channel, total views of 
all the provider’s videos, total views of the provider’s channel page, number of videos, 
number of friends, number of subscriptions the provider has to other providers, channel 
views rank, and video views rank. The video level data include video ID, data collection 
date, date when the video is posted, the provider of the video, number of views, category 
                                                 
10 In this study, we focus on social learning and network effects given that consumers are aware of the 
video. We do not study how consumers become aware of a video. That is why we select the videos 
published by the top 1,000 YouTube providers as our sample. 
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in which the video belongs, video length, whether the video has an in-stream ad, average 
rating, number of times the video is favorited by viewers, and number of comments. All 
videos in our sample are published on March 1, 2012. Because YouTube Analytics data 
is updated daily, the first day in our analysis is March 2, 2012. Summary statistics of the 
video characteristics at the beginning of our data collection period are reported in Table 
2.1. We assume that each viewer watches a video only once. Consumers may repeatedly 
watch a video. However, Susarla et al. (2011) argue that the bias caused by repeated 
viewings is small by taking logs of views. Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the 
characteristics of our YouTube providers.  
Table 2.1: The First-Day Video Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of video views 2,497.20 8,524.969 2 107,628 
Video rating 4.692 0.5066 1.76 5 
Number of times the video being favorited 139.507 495.910 0 6,800 
Number of comments 384.173 1030.539 0 9,832 
In-stream ads (yes-1, no-0) 0.5359 0.4995 0 1 
 
Table 2.2. The First-Day Chanel Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total views of the provider's channel page 1.32e+07 2.01e+07 3,175,291 1.75e+08 
Total views of all the provider's videos 1.87e+08 2.38e+08 3,690,640 1.55e+09 
Number of subscribers to the provider's channel 298,743.8 459,699.2 9,200 5,109,145 
Number of subscriptions by the provider to others 183.6144 1,063.834 0 17,641 
Number of videos 267.9837 289.788 1 969 
Number of friends 16,976.32 22,916.99 0 120,570 
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2.5 Empirical Framework 
2.5.1 Identification of the Surprise 
In our theoretical model, the surprise is defined as the difference between the 
revealed quality and the prior mean,      
  . Following Moretti (2011), we empirically 
define the surprise as the difference between realized video views and predicted video 
views at time 1 (March 2, 2012).11 In our study, we obtain a measure of the surprise using 
the prediction errors. More specifically, we use the characteristics of YouTube providers 
(channel) to predict the video views on the first day. Then, we obtain the residual from a 
regression of first-day log views on the characteristics of YouTube providers at time 1 as 
a measure of video-specific surprise. The residual is considered as the difference between 
the realized video views and the predicted video views at time 1 and thus the measure of 
surprise. However, the residual may change with different functional forms used for the 
predicted views. Therefore, as a robustness check, we test our hypotheses with different 
regression forms for video views. 
The characteristics of YouTube providers are reasonable measures of expected 
video quality. Most consumers on YouTube subscribe to some channels they like. By 
subscribing to a channel, they receive updates and are informed when new videos are 
uploaded by the provider. Consumers expect that a high-quality channel will upload high-
quality videos. 
Table 2.3 illustrates the first-stage regression results of first-day (March 2, 2012) 
log video views on channel characteristics at time 1. The residual obtained from this first-
stage regression is used in the tests for Hypothesis 2.1. The channel characteristics 
include the log of total views of channel j’s videos,        ; the log of total views of the 
                                                 
11 In finance literature, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document a momentum phenomenon: Firms reporting 
positive earnings surprises outperform firms reporting negative earnings surprises. 
 65 
provider’s channel page,        ; the log number of uploaded videos of the channel, 
       ; the number of the provider’s subscribers,     ; and the number of other 
providers the provider subscribe to,              . Column 1 in Table 2.3 shows the 
regression results. Column 2 and 3 indicate that the results are robust to other regression 
specifications.  
Table 2.3: Identification of the Surprise: First-Stage Regression  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lvviews 0.444*** 0.445*** 0.449*** 0.0952*** 
 
[12.83] [12.89] [13.0] [3.112] 
lcviews 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.0799* 
 
[4.809] [4.798] [4.710] [1.661] 
lvideos 0.0175 0.0176 0.0179 0.0171 
 
[0.564] [0.568] [0.579] [1.512] 
subs 3.26e-08 3.29e-08 
 
4.43e-08 
 
[0.138] [0.140] 
 
[0.530] 
subscriptions 2.71e-06 
  
1.33e-05 
 
[0.0360] 
  
[0.504] 
constant 1.630 1.629 1.410 5.090*** 
 
[0.684] [0.685] [0.787] [5.886] 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.544 0.528 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
One may wonder if the residual is a robust measure of surprise. We also use 
another empirical definition of surprise to show the robustness: the difference between 
realized video ratings and predicted video ratings at time 1. Similarly, we run a regression 
of first-day video ratings on the characteristics of YouTube providers. This regression is 
shown in Column 4 in Table 2.3. Then, we obtain the residual from it as a measure of 
surprise. In Section 2.5.2 and Section 2.5.3, we will show that our empirical results are 
robust to different empirical definitions of surprise. One may also wonder if the residual 
could contain a number of omitted variables that are observable to the viewer but not 
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measured by the researcher. If it is the case, the residual will be systematically correlated 
with viewership. We run a regression of log views on the residual at time 1, and the 
coefficient is not significant (p value = 0.331).  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Daily Views for Videos with Different Surprises 
Figure 2.3 shows a clear example of videos with different surprises. The figure 
plots the daily video views for a video with a positive surprise (video 2) and a video with 
a negative surprise (video 1). These two videos belong to the same YouTube video 
category and have similar initial views, but experience different growth patterns: Video 2, 
having positive surprise, has a significantly higher growth rate than video 1, having a 
negative surprise. The first-day views of video 1 and video 2 are roughly the same (    
and     respectively). However, at the end of our sample period, views of video 1 and 
views of video 2 are       and        respectively. As was stated in our theoretical 
model, this striking difference can be caused by social learning over time.  
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2.5.2 A Test of Social Learning 
Hypothesis 2.1 indicates that in the presence of social learning, the growth rate of 
views of a video with a positive surprise is higher than the growth rate of views of a 
video with a negative surprise. If only network effects exist, we should see no significant 
difference between the growth rate of a video with a positive surprise and that of a video 
with a negative surprise.  
Our empirical approach is based on the literature on treatment effects 
(Wooldridge 2007). The positive surprise is interpreted as the "treatment", and views of 
"treated" videos are compared to the views of videos with negative surprises.  
To test whether the difference between the growth rates is significant, we estimate 
the following model using difference-in-difference: 
                       
                    (2.3) 
where           is the log of views of video   at time  ,   represents the time period,    
represents unobserved fixed effect of video  , and     includes the characteristics of 
video   that change over time, such as        (the video ratings),      (the number of 
YouTube Favorites),         (the number of video comments),        (the log 
number of uploaded videos of the channel),         (the log of total video views of the 
channel), and      (the number of channel subscriptions). We control the marketing 
efforts of YouTube providers on Twitter, which are measured by             , the total 
number of tweets containing the unique YouTube video ID and the word “uploaded.” 
Unlike Duan et al. (2009) and Susarla et al. (2011), equation (2.3) does not contain lags 
of accumulative views, because the lag terms do not help distinguish between social 
learning and network effects. In our context, there are two reasons why lags of views can 
have a positive effect on current views: (1) Consumers learn from other people’s choices. 
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They infer the quality is high when they see a larger number of accumulative views. (2) 
Consumers can obtain a higher utility from a larger view base because they enjoy 
discussing a video with their peers. 
In the regression,    is a dummy variable indicating whether the surprise of video 
  is positive (    , if the surprise is positive;     , otherwise), and     is the error 
term. Following the literature on treatment effects (Wooldridge 2007), we make the 
unconfoundedness assumption:      is strictly exogenous. Note that correlation 
between      and     for any time   and time   causes inconsistency in regression 
coefficients. Thus, we need to control the time-varying heterogeneity (   ), and the 
unobserved fixed effect in the regression. If the surprise assignment (positive or negative) 
changes in reaction to past outcomes on          , strict exogeneity can be violated 
(Wooldridge 2007). However, the surprise assignment is determined at time 1 and is 
independent of the idiosyncratic views shocks in period  . So strict exogeneity is a 
reasonable assumption. 
We are interested in the difference-in-difference estimator,   . If     , then the 
difference between the growth rates is positive. It is consistent with Hypothesis 2.1 and 
implies the existence of social learning. If     , then the growth rates of video views 
with different surprises are the same, which indicates there is no significant social 
learning on YouTube. 
Regression results are shown in Table 2.4. In the table,                 . 
Column 1 shows the results from a regression that includes all the coefficients specified 
by (2.3). In this regression,  ̂         and is significantly positive, which confirms 
Hypothesis 2.1. Column 2 shows that the basic result is robust to an alternative model 
specification.  
 69 
Table 2.4: Regression of Video Views on Surprises: A Test of Social Learning 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
interaction 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0280*** -0.00118 0.0176*** 
 
[12.58] [12.55] [7.727] [-0.632] [30.86] 
rating 0.262*** 0.268*** 1.542*** 1.105*** 0.206*** 
 
[2.934] [2.997] [2.771] [2.652] [2.442] 
favs 0.000110*** 0.000125*** 0.000834*** 0.000134 0.000172*** 
 
[2.920] [3.810] [6.157] [0.890] [4.87] 
comment 0.000213*** 0.000222*** -0.000406*** 0.000423*** 0.000134*** 
 
[7.835] [8.589] [-3.369] [4.506] [5.204] 
sum_upload 0.0300 
  
 0.0241 
 
[0.461] 
  
 [0.390] 
Observations 9060 9060 3390 1290 9060 
R-squared 0.328 0.328 0.459 0.564 0.110 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effect of social learning may differ across video categories. Column 3 and 
Column 4 are regression results for subsamples of two different categories: “Music” and 
“Tech.” According to a survey by Sysomos Inc.12, music is the most popular category on 
YouTube, and Tech is the least popular category. In Column 3,  ̂        , which is 
significantly larger than the estimate in Column 1 and 2. It shows that social learning is 
more pronounced for videos belonging to category “Music.” In Column 4,  ̂  
        , which is not significantly different from zero. Social learning is not 
significant for videos in category “Tech.” The evidence shows that social learning is 
more pronounced for videos belonging to more popular categories. Given the large 
number of reviews for videos belonging to more popular categories, consumers rely more 
on social learning in the context of YouTube. Column 5 shows that the results are robust 
when we define the surprise as the difference between realized video ratings and 
predicted video ratings. These results help social media managers answer the question 
                                                 
12 http://www.sysomos.com/reports/youtube/ 
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regarding which content creators should be subsidized. We provide evidence suggesting 
that social learning is more pronounced for videos in more popular categories. The role of 
social learning becomes more salient in a mass market than in a niche market. As such, 
content creators in popular categories may benefit more from subsidizing. 
Hypothesis 2.2 indicates that social learning is more important for videos with 
less precise priors. To test the hypothesis, we estimate the following model: 
                       
      (    )    (        ) 
   (           )            (2.4) 
where        is a measure of the prior precision of video  . Here we propose the total 
views of the provider’s channel page on the first day (March 2, 2012) to empirically 
identify which videos have more precise priors. YouTube users upload videos to their 
YouTube channels. A consumer has a better idea of the quality of a new video published 
by a high-ranking channel (in terms of channel page views) because the consumer is 
more likely to have watched another video published by the same channel before. In this 
case, videos published by higher-ranking channels have more precise priors. We divide 
the sample into two equally sized groups by channel views: the high-ranking group and 
the low-ranking group. If a video belongs to the high-ranking group, then the dummy 
        ; otherwise,         . 
The coefficient of interest here is    in the regression model (4). Table 2.5 
illustrates that the empirical evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2.2. In the table, 
               , and                    . In Column 1, we find that the 
coefficient on        ,  ̂ , is        , which is significantly negative. We can consider 
two identical videos with the same positive surprise except for the fact that the first 
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belongs to the high-ranking group and the second belongs to the low-ranking group. In 
the presence of social learning, a negative    implies that the growth rate of views of the 
second video is higher than the growth rate of views of the first video. In other words, 
social learning has a greater effect on videos with less precise priors, which supports 
Hypothesis 2.2. Column 2 indicates that the estimate of    is robust to a different 
specification.  
Table 2.5: The Effect of Prior Precision on Social Learning 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
interaction 0.0152*** 0.0333*** 0.0129*** 
 
[12.15] [9.581] [10.76] 
tprior 0.0113*** 0.0482*** 0.0236*** 
 
[15.15] [25.47] [30.88] 
tdprior -0.0151*** -0.0523*** -0.0162*** 
 
[-8.142] [-10.16] [-9.050] 
rating 0.154* 
 
0.0371 
 
[1.744] 
 
[0.445] 
favs 0.000136*** 
 
6.40e-05* 
 
[3.677] 
 
[1.823] 
comment 0.000160*** 0.000871*** 0.000265*** 
 
[5.943] [18.99] [10.43] 
sum_upload 0.0157 
 
0.186*** 
 
[0.246] 
 
[3.058] 
Observations 9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.353 0.253 0.222 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also show that the regression results are robust to different measures of the 
prior precision. We use another measure of the prior precision: the number of subscribers. 
If more YouTube users subscribe to a channel, consumers are more certain about the 
quality of the videos from that channel. Similarly, we divide the sample into two equally 
sized groups, based on subscribers rank. If a video belongs to the high-ranking group, 
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then the dummy         ; otherwise,         . Column 3 in Table 2.5 shows that 
the coefficient on         is significantly negative. It implies that different measures of 
the prior precision do not affect our key results. 
2.5.3 A Test of Network Effects  
In this section, we test the existence of network effects on YouTube using the 
presence of in-stream ads as a source of exogenous variation for existing levels of video 
views. YouTube in-stream ads run only on partner videos. Only successful content 
creators are qualified for the partner program, and videos published by them might 
contain in-stream ads. It is reasonable to assume that the presence of in-stream ads is 
exogenous in our context. One might argue that advertisers are more likely to use the 
channels that have higher viewership and higher quality videos. However, all of our 
sample videos are published by the top content creators on YouTube, and almost all of 
them have been partners before our data collection. The presence of in-stream ads is not 
likely to be correlated with video quality.13 
Network effects are identified by isolating the surprises caused solely by the 
presence of in-stream ads. YouTube bundles video content with in-stream ads, which are 
intrusive to many consumers.14 The presence of in-stream ads is a negative shock that can 
reduce the viewer base. If network effects exist on YouTube, the negative shock lowers 
the growth rate of views at time 1, and then it further lowers the growth rate at time 2. As 
time goes on, we should see a significantly negative self-reinforcing feedback loop. 
However, such a negative shock does not contain any information of the video quality. If 
                                                 
13 Empirically, we find that the presence of in-stream ads is not significantly correlated with viewership in 
our sample. 
14 Wilbur (2008) estimates a two-sided model of the television industry and shows that viewers tend to be 
averse to advertising. Anderson and Gans (2011) study an advertising-sponsored content provision model 
and interpret advertising clutter as a "price" paid by viewers who enjoy the content. 
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social learning is the sole form of social contagion, the Bayesian learning process remains 
unchanged. The negative shock can decrease the viewership at time 1, but the long run 
growth rate of video views should not be affected significantly (no self-reinforcing 
feedback loop).15 If a consumer is shown an ad before the video, one may think this could 
impact social learning in that this would result in lower consumer satisfaction and more 
negative word of mouth. However, the additional information about ads from the peers is 
redundant. When consumers make decisions on whether to watch the video, they know 
whether the video contains an ad.16 In summary, if there exists only social learning with 
network effects absent, the presence of ads is a transitory shock that does not have 
significant long run effect. If network effects exist, the presence of ads results in a 
negative self-reinforcing feedback loop.   
We re-estimate (2.3) to test network effects, using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression. We instrument the surprise dummy    using the in-stream ads     .      is a 
dummy, where        if the video has an in-stream ad, and        otherwise. 
Generally, 2SLS is used to avoid endogeneity. However, we use the first-stage regression 
to isolate the surprises that are caused solely by the shock of in-stream ads. We are 
interested in the coefficient    in the regression model (3) in Section 2.5. If Hypothesis 
2.3 is supported, we expect to see that     , which implies that negative surprises 
lower the future views. In this case, network effects are significant. If     , it means 
that the network effects on YouTube are not significant, and the dominant causal social 
contagion is social learning.  
                                                 
15 Let video j is a video without an ad, and video j’ is a video contains an ad. Other things being equal, we 
can obtain                                                                         
                        from our model of social learning.  
16 When consumers are shown an ad before the video, they can choose to switch to other videos. It is 
equivalent to not watching the video.  
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Table 2.6 shows the results of the test.    is the coefficient on             
(    ). Column 1 and 2 represent different model specifications. We find that  ̂  is 
significantly positive under all specifications. The result suggests that social learning is 
not the only causal social contagion on YouTube, and network effects also play a critical 
role. The test confirms Hypothesis 2.3: the existence of network effects on YouTube. 
Column 3 shows that the results are robust when the surprise is defined as the difference 
between realized video ratings and predicted video ratings. 
Table 2.6: A Test of Network Effects: 2SLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
interaction 0.00670** 0.00667** 0.0036*** 
 
[2.540] [2.509] [2.583] 
rating 0.436*** 0.438*** 0.430*** 
 
[5.213] [5.248] [5.210] 
favs 0.000170*** 0.000174*** 0.0002*** 
 
[4.794] [5.587] [5.582] 
comment 0.000138*** 0.000141*** 0.0001*** 
 
[5.425] [5.853] [4.831] 
sum_upload -0.00957 
 
-0.0198 
 
[-0.157] 
 
[-0.334] 
Observations 9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.241 0.241 0.241 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A straightforward implication of our study is that YouTube should take social 
learning and network effects into account when fostering the growth of video views. Our 
results suggest that social contagion on YouTube is driven by both social learning and by 
network effects. Considering that the amount of a traditional marketing campaign of 
YouTube content is limited, consumers rely heavily on advice from others to make 
decisions about watching videos. Social learning and network effects differ from 
traditional marketing activity in their social multiplier effect. From a managerial 
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perspective, YouTube can play a much greater role in encouraging the creation of 
original content because, as it nurtures and subsidizes individual content creators, the 
multiplier effect of both social learning and network effects extends their reach.17 
2.6 Application: How to Go Viral?  
Social learning and network effects outline two ways that a video could go viral 
and gain success. Through examining the most popular videos on YouTube, we are able 
to categorize them into two distinct groups: the group consists of videos that feature high 
quality, engaging scenes, articulated story lines (high-quality videos), and the other group 
of videos often include questionable behaviors that deviate from social norms yet still 
gain tremendous popularity (attention grabbers). The recent “Pussy Riot” incident in 
Russia serves as a good example of a typical attention grabber. This Russia-based 
feminist rock band protested against the political scene in Russia through unorthodox 
musical performances and produced YouTube videos that went viral overnight. It is 
worth noting that Pussy Riot did not gain international fame through their musicality per 
se; instead, most viewers were drawn to those videos out of curiosity and were interested 
in the messages the music carried. 
One type of strategy often adopted is the inclusion of controversial elements in 
videos. Instances of such often provoke controversy and stir heated discussion revolving 
around those contents. This type of videos tends to attract critical reviews from both sides 
of the spectrum; viewers feel strongly and emotionally attached to the video in either 
extremely positive or negative ways. In contrast to those quality-oriented productions, the 
                                                 
17 In fact, YouTube is providing creators with resources and opportunities to improve their skills, build 
larger audiences, and make more money through its partnership program. As a New York Times article 
reported (Miller 2011), a sketch comedy show called “AsKassem,” is financed by grants from YouTube. 
The amount of content on YouTube covered by partnership agreements has risen steadily, to 10% of the 
total videos.   
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goal of attention grabbers is primarily to attract attentions or promote ideas. Intuitively 
speaking, we would not expect too much social learning effect to take place for the 
popularity of this type of video. In an analytical model, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) shows 
that a firm can earn higher profits by employing pure attention grabbers with positive 
probability. Similarly, we propose that, as suggested by their discussion-provoking 
nature, videos with attention grabbing content can initiate higher network effects, and 
viewers find it valuable to watch them because these videos allow them to engage in 
discussions with their social contacts. Therefore, we hypothesize that this type of videos 
gains popularity mostly through network effects as opposed to social learning:  
Hypothesis 2.4. (a) Network effects are more pronounced for videos with attention 
grabbing content. (b) Social learning is more pronounced for high-quality videos.  
To test Hypothesis 2.4, we estimate the following two models: 
                       
             
    (            )    (               )       (2.5) 
and 
                         
               
     (          )     (             )       (2.6) 
where            is a measure indicating whether video   is a video with attention 
grabbing content, and          is a measure indicating whether video   is a high-quality 
video. Here we use views rank and rating rank to empirically identify videos with high 
quality or attention grabbers. We define high-quality videos as videos with both high 
views rank and high ratings, and attention grabbing videos as videos with high views 
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rank but mixed ratings. The co-existence of extremely high and extremely low ratings 
often suggests controversy. Specifically, if both the views and the rating of video   at the 
end of our sample period rank among top     of total videos, then it is considered as a 
high-quality video, and the dummy           ; otherwise,           . If the views 
of video   at the end of our sample period rank among top    , but the rating is in the 
lowest    , then it is a video with controversial content, and the dummy            
 ; otherwise,             .  
Table 2.7. High-Quality Videos vs. Attention Grabbers 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
t * D * attention 0.0145*** 
  
 
[6.330] 
  
t * D * quality 
 
0.368** -0.0208 
  
[2.014] [-0.281] 
rating 0.0307 0.0525 0.188 
 
[0.393] [0.238] [1.295] 
favs 0.000145*** -0.000621* 0.00034*** 
 
[4.416] [-1.672] [4.309] 
comment 0.000140*** 0.000853*** 1.50e-06 
 
[5.821] [10.21] [0.0169] 
sum_upload 0.0342 0.0715 -0.164 
 
[0.603] [0.378] [-1.254] 
Observations  9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.193 0.117 0.161 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to study the network effects for different videos, we estimate the 
regression model (2.5) using 2SLS. Similarly, we instrument the surprise dummy    
using the in-stream ads     .    in (2.5) is the coefficient of interest.      means the 
impact of network effects is larger for attention grabbing videos. Column 1 of Table 2.7 
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presents the regression results. We find that    is significantly positive, supporting 
Hypothesis 2.4(a).  
To study social learning, we first estimate regression model (2.6) without using an 
instrument variable. In Column 2 of Table 2.7,     is the coefficient on      
        . We find that     is significantly positive, which suggests that social contagion 
is more pronounced for high-quality videos. However, it does not provide sufficient 
evidence for social learning because social contagion can be driven by network effects as 
well. Therefore, we re-estimate (2.6) using      as an instrument variable. The result is 
presented in Column 3 of Table 2.7. We find that             and is not significant, 
which indicates that high-quality videos do not have higher network effects. Combining 
the results shown in Column 2 and 3, we can conclude that social learning is more 
pronounced for high-quality videos. In other words, Hypothesis 2.4(b) is also supported. 
Our empirical results of hypothesis testing provide supports for the strategic use of 
attention grabbers (Eliaz and Spiegler 2011). 
2.7 Conclusions  
Previous literature has focused on distinguishing social contagion from 
homophily, but only provides limited insights into how to disentangle social learning and 
network effects in the context of UGC. In this chapter, we developed an empirical 
framework that allows us to make a causal inference about the presence of social learning 
and network effects on YouTube. More specifically, by applying a theoretical model, we 
conducted a two-stage test and examine the existence of social learning and network 
effects using a unique data set from YouTube.  
Although in this study we only focused on social learning and network effects on 
UGC sites, our tests are relatively generalizable and can be practically carried out by 
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practitioners in social media. We categorized the most popular videos on YouTube into 
quality-oriented videos and anti-social videos, and found that videos with anti-social 
content initiate higher network effects than quality-oriented productions. These findings 
provide a nuanced view of how YouTube can best subsidize the content creators.  
While this study has highlighted the importance of social learning and network 
effects, our work does not consider the effect of network characteristics and network 
topological structure on social contagion (Ghose et al. 2012). Further work could 
incorporate network data to examine the effect of network structure and tie strength on 
social learning and network effects.  
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Chapter 3:   Improving Internet Security Through Social 
Information and Social Comparison 
3.1 Introduction 
2011 was a busy year for cyber attacks on many organizations, with targeted 
attacks increasing by 400%. Industries such as credit card companies, gaming platforms, 
banks, retailers, TV networks, and government agencies all fell victim to cybercrime, 
which is not only increasing in frequency but also in the severity of damage. According 
to the Ponemon Institute, the median cost caused by cybercrime is $5.9 million per year 
per company, with a range from $1.5 million to $36.5 million. The costs consist of both 
direct expenses (recovery, detection, etc.) and indirect costs (information loss, business 
disruption, revenue loss, equipment damages, etc.). However, the study by Ponemon 
Institute also shows that nearly all of these attacks were avoidable. Most attacks were 
carried out using fairly simple methods and could have been stopped easily with basic or 
intermediate controls. Although most attacks were targeted, the target selection was 
based more on opportunity than on choice. Most organizations fell victims not because 
they were pre-identified but because they were found to possess exploitable 
vulnerabilities. About 50-75% of security incidents originated from within an 
organization (D’Arcy et al. 2009). Ninety-six percent of victim organizations subject to 
the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) were not in compliance.  
Organizations generally underinvest in Internet security because of the following 
reasons.  First of all, Internet security is often considered too expensive to achieve. 
Security products and services are sometimes regarded as useful and desirable, yet not 
affordable. High-level security practices can be reinforced to prevent security disasters 
and control the damage. The deployment of such practices, however, is a costly endeavor 
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for organizations without assured significant benefit. With the proliferation of mobile 
devices, the increasing number of locations and devices where information can be stored 
further adds to the cost for prevention and protection. Second, although the costs for 
security are too high, the rewards are unclear. It is difficult to measure the risk and 
potential costs of security breaches beforehand. The frustrating fact about security is that 
although insecurity is easy to prove, security can never be conclusive. Third, the absence 
of legislative enforcement leads to the lack of transparency. Although recent progress in 
data breach notification laws requires companies to notify those customers whose 
information has been lost or stolen, companies generally can choose not to reveal 
publicly any attacks, in order to avoid reputation loss. Without transparency, 
organizations can claim to be secure even if their systems are, in fact, vulnerable, and 
customers cannot accurately estimate the risk of doing business with them. Moreover, 
Internet security is a public good in that an organization’s security (insecurity) can 
benefit (hurt) others. The security vulnerabilities of an organization are often used against 
other organizations. For example, botnets opportunistically scan the Internet to find and 
compromise systems with exploitable weaknesses. These compromised computers are 
then utilized to collectively attack other targeted systems as in a typical denial of service 
attack.  
Although they focus on technical solutions, existing studies often tend to ignore 
the motivational issue, which is a common problem in private provisions of public goods 
such as charitable giving (Frey and Meier 2004, Shang and Croson 2009) and 
contribution to online communities (Bulter 2001, Chen et al. 2010). Social psychologists 
have documented the existence of social loafing—that people exert less effort on a 
collective task than they do on a comparable individual task. According to social 
comparison theory, which was initially proposed by Festinger (1954), people have the 
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desire to gain information on others and evaluation on themselves. When information on 
others is available, people tend to evaluate themselves in comparison with others. As a 
result of the self-evaluation, the existence of discrepancy in a social group would lead to 
action on the part of group members to reduce the discrepancy. People generally care 
about their social status, often measured by ordinal ranks within their social groups, 
especially when status is made public and can influence one’s reputation (Griskevicius et 
al. 2010). As a result, status competition is often utilized to encourage desirable 
behaviors. Because of the concern for customer switch, organizations have even stronger 
incentives than individuals to maintain their status among peers. Reputation in Internet 
security signals a company’s valuation for customer information and ability to take 
appropriate security controls. In the present article,, we propose to solve the 
underinvestment problem by making such information publicly available, in order to 
solicit social comparison and status competition. Equivalent to rewarding prosocial 
behavior with status and prestige, we can penalize proself behavior with shame and 
reputation loss by making these behaviors notorious.   
We incentivize organizations to increase security spending through our reputation 
system, an online website that regularly aggregates individual organizations’ security 
information and releases explicit comparison results as relative performance ranking to 
the public. It is worth noting that often it is the information aggregation and feedback 
rather than the information itself that is missing. In the present study, we make use of the 
available information through third-party monitoring on outgoing spam as the focus 
security issue. However, the methodology also applies to other security problems, for 
which data can be collected through public policies on mandatory reporting, in the 
absence of available data. It has been recognized that a key factor required to improve 
Internet security is the gathering, analysis, and sharing of information related to security 
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issues (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
formally asked public companies to disclose cyber attacks against them in October 2011. 
However, no pre-attack information is currently available for businesses and individuals 
to take precautionary actions. To solicit social comparison, the social information 
provided needs to reveal what constitutes the right behavior and who behaves that way 
and who does not.  
To test the impact of the specific information released through our website, we 
conducted a field quasi-experiment in which the released information was used as 
experimental treatment. To draw attention to our system, we deliberately chose the 
United States, Canada, Belgium, and Turkey as four treatment countries and did 
extensive promotion for our website within these countries. The treatment countries were 
then matched with four control countries according to population and the severity of the 
security problem before our experiment. Countries were used as clusters of organizations 
so that an organization was compared to other organizations within the same country. For 
organizations in the treatment group, the information on the organizations with the 
severest security problem in the country was released monthly on our website, whereas 
similar information was kept internally only for the control group. Although the treatment 
assignment is at the cluster level, the measurement is at the individual level. The field 
setting ensures that organizations and the public behave in a natural manner. A 
difference-in-difference model is used to test the treatment effect. The results show that 
the treated organizations improved their security situations more than the control 
organizations. We also find that the more security observed for other organizations, the 
more likely an organization will be to improve its own security situation. 
 Our approach for improving Internet security is complementary to existing 
technical approaches. The vast technical literature, especially in the computer science 
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area, has focused on the development of technologies to secure computer systems, such 
as secure networking protocols, intrusion detection techniques, database security 
methods, and access control technologies (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). By focusing on 
organizations’ incentives to invest in these technologies, we aim to extend prior work and 
provide a more comprehensive lens for studying Internet security. Our study sheds light 
on public policy issues concerning security information disclosure and provides a new 
perspective for dealing with other environmental issues such as pollution, energy 
conservation, and global warming, where externality leads to a lack of incentives for 
taking pro-social behavior.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Internet Security 
Existing literature on information security focuses on organizational strategies 
that can be used for reducing system risk, including deterrence, prevention, detection, and 
recovery (Straub and Welke 1998). For deterrence and prevention, most previous studies, 
from the organizational perspective, have examined the impact of security policy and 
practice on information systems abuse or misuse (Kankanhalli et al. 2003, D’Acy et al. 
2009). For detection and recovery, research has been focused on how to identify attack 
traffic that could originate from both internal and external sources in a cost-effective way 
(Yue and Cakanyildirim 2007, Mookerjee et al. 2011) Specifically for anti-spam, the 
filtering techniques consist of machine learning (Goodman et al. 2007), crowdsourcing 
and IP blacklisting (Ramachandran et al. 2011), screening humans from bots for botnets 
(Isacenkova and Balzarotti 2011), and Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) (Moyer 
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2011). However, the problem for any technical solutions is that hackers can always 
respond strategically. The interplay is an endless cat-and-mouse game.  
Security vulnerability disclosure is an area of public policy that has been subject 
to considerable debate. Studies on software vulnerability disclosure have shown that 
although disclosing vulnerability information provides an impetus to the vendor to 
release patches early, instant disclosure leaves users defenseless against attackers who 
can exploit the disclosed vulnerability. Arora et al. (2004a) found that although vendors 
are quick to respond to instant disclosure, vulnerability disclosure also increases the 
frequency of attacks. Arora et al. (2004b) suggested that the optimal vulnerability 
disclosure depends on underlying factors such as how quickly vendors respond to 
disclosure by releasing patches and how likely attackers are to find and exploit 
undisclosed or unpatched vulnerabilities. Although there has been no public disclosure on 
information security vulnerability, industry-based Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs), where security breach information is revealed to information-sharing 
alliance, has been established to facilitate the sharing of security information to enhance 
and protect critical cyber infrastructure. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) studied the economic 
incentives for security information sharing and found that information sharing yields 
greater benefits in more competitive industries. Gordon et al. (2003) examined how 
information sharing affects the overall level of information security when firms face the 
trade-off between improved information security and the potential for free riding.  
3.2.2 Regulations on Information Disclosure 
Security information disclosure laws have been focused on data breach 
notification. Although a national data-breach law is still under consideration, as of 
August 20, 2012, 46 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the 
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Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring notification of security breaches 
involving personal information. The specific requirements of notification laws vary 
across states. Some laws require notification when the personal information is reasonably 
assumed to have been acquired by an unauthorized party, whereas others require 
notification only if it is reasonable to believe the information will cause harm to 
consumers. The consequences of not complying differ from state to state as well. 
However, the rationales for these laws are consistent, which is also consistent with our 
rational for public disclosure of security vulnerabilities, that notification can provide 
public information and create an incentive for all firms (even those that have not been 
breached) (Schwartz and Janger 2007, Romanosky et al. 2011). 
However, the impact of data breach disclosure is still in debate. The concerns 
include the following: (1) Firms must comply with multiple, disparate, and perhaps 
conflicting state laws (Romanosky et al 2011); and (2) notifications simply shift the 
burden to consumers if breaches really cause harm (Cate 2009). Otherwise, they are just 
unnecessary costs. Romanosky et al. (2011) found that data breach disclosure can reduce 
identity theft caused by data breaches. Campbell et al. (2003) found a highly significant 
negative impact of security breaches reported in newspapers on the stock price of the 
breached company only when the breach involved unauthorized access to confidential 
data. In contrast, Kannan et al. (2007) found that security breach announcements have no 
significant negative impact on market return in the long run.  
The impact of information disclosure has also been widely studied in areas other 
than security. Jin and Leslie (2003) studied health information disclosure in the restaurant 
industry and found that disclosing hygiene quality information increases health inspection 
scores and lowers certain diseases. Cain et al. (2005) examined the effect of disclosing 
conflicts of interest and found that the disclosure can have perverse effects because 
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advice receivers do not discount advice sufficiently, and that advice givers exaggerate 
advice even further.  Other information disclosure studies are related to auto safety, 
public education, and so on (Fung et al. 2007). These studies provide some evidence of 
how information disclosure can affect firm behavior. On the basis of these studies, we 
further add the aggregation and presentation of information, which can leverage 
reputation and peer influence to enhance disclosure effect. 
3.2.3 The Economics of Internet Security 
It has long been recognized that Internet security is not a problem that technology 
alone can solve (Arora et al. 2004a). Many security questions are at least as much 
economic as technical. Fundamentally, Internet insecurity is the result of perverse 
incentives, which are distorted by network externalities, asymmetric information, moral 
hazard, adverse selection, liability dumping, and the so-called tragedy of the commons 
(Anderson 2001). Systems fail often because of misplaced economic incentives: The 
people who could protect a system are not the ones who suffer the costs of failure 
(Schneier 2002). Security failure is caused as much by bad incentives as by bad design 
(Anderson and Moore 2006). Meanwhile, hacking has evolved over the past a few years 
to become a well-organized, sophisticated underground market. 
The economic incentive problem is caused by negative externality of insecurity. 
Externality happens because social costs or benefits are not equal to private costs or 
benefits (Pigou 1920, Dahlman 1979). Negative externality happens when social costs are 
greater than private costs, whereas positive externality happens when social benefits are 
greater than private benefits. Security vulnerabilities of a system are often exploited by 
hackers to attack other systems. For example, spam has such an extreme negative 
externality that the social costs are about 100 times the private benefits (Rao and Reiley 
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2012). More and more studies have recognized the importance of security externalities 
and have come up with several economic and legal policy proposals. The standard 
economic treatment for negative externality is to impose a Pigouvian tax on the activity 
that generates negative externality (Pigou 1920, Dahlman 1979). For spam, researchers in 
many studies have proposed to have the spam sender pay the receiver for attention or 
levy penalties on consumers who purchase goods from spammers (Kraut et al. 2002, 
Loder et al. 2004). However, these proposals raise the concerns for privacy and account 
hijacking by hackers. The legal treatment is to let government make law or regulation 
enforcements. For spam, the legal interventions include requiring legal advertisers to 
offer opt-in or opt-out choices for email receivers and putting legal pressure on banks that 
process payments from foreign banks known to act on behalf of spam merchants (Sipior 
et al. 2004). However, since most security problems such as spam and phishing may 
involve parties in different administrative areas, jurisdictional boundaries render the 
proposals unrealistic.  
3.2.4 Social Comparison 
In a social community, participants tend to compare themselves to others when 
social information on other participants’ behaviors is available, and such social 
comparisons in turn affect behaviors (Festinger 1954). Perceptions of relative standing 
can influence many outcomes. A number of studies have found that self-reported 
happiness may be more sensitive to relative than to absolute income (Hopkins and 
Kornienko 2004, Luttmer 2005). The interdependent preferences can be represented 
either by utility functions that depend not only on the absolute value of consumption but 
also on the average level of consumption within a population, or by including concern for 
status, the ordinal rank in the distribution. The reasons for status concern may be 
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intrinsic, a fundamental human characteristic, or instrumental: Status is desirable because 
it allows better consumption opportunities (Hopkins and Kornienko 2004).  
The availability of social information is the prerequisite for social comparison. 
Recent theories on pro-social behavior have focused on “conditional cooperation”: 
People are more willing to contribute when information is provided that many others 
contribute (Frey and Meier 2004). Satio (2011) suggested that individuals feel ashamed 
about a choice that does not maximize the payoffs of others only when the choice is made 
in public. Dillenberger and Sadowski (2010) also proposed that a person’s behavior may 
depend on whether it is observed by someone who is directly affected by it and 
considered shame as a moral cost for a person’s utility. These concepts can be extended 
to organizational behavior since organizations are concerned about their social image and 
reputation (Frei 2010), their relative standing in comparison to other businesses. These 
social factors such as reputation and social image are valuable assets for a business not 
only because organizations have the desire for prestige, esteem, popularity, or acceptance 
(Bernheim 1994), but also because they lead to better business opportunities. With the 
increasing concern for privacy and confidentiality, customers are likely to choose or 
switch to firms with a more secure information system.  
Social comparison and social information are often used to solve the problem of 
social loafing, the reduction in motivation and effort when individuals work collectively 
as compared with when they work individually. The reasons include reduced individual 
motivation and coordination loss (Karau and Williams 1993). Both reasons exist in the 
context of Internet security. The former is due to the externalities, whereas the latter is 
due to the cost of security efforts. Reputation loss imposed by making relevant social 
information available can serve as a binding force against social loafing (Akerlof 1980).  
Social norm formed through social information provision has two effects on pro-social 
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behavior: the focusing influence whereby norms impact behavior only when an 
individual’s attention is drawn to them, and the informational influence whereby norms 
exerts a stronger impact on an individual the more he observes others behaving 
consistently with that norm (Krupka and Weber 2009). In the present article, we aim to 
leverage both effects to motivate pro-social behavior. 
3.3 Field Quasi-Experiment 
Field experimentation has been used extensively to provide solid knowledge of 
causation for policy evaluation (Duflo et al. 2010). It has also been used to study 
information security and privacy (Hui et al. 2007). Experimental studies randomly assign 
participants into treatment groups or control groups. Randomization, although more 
desirable in an ideal environment, is inappropriate given our circumstance. In the present 
study, we aimed to evaluate whether public information disclosure can lead to security 
improvement; thus, the attention to the disclosed information is critical. Rather than 
randomly choosing some countries for treatment, it is more pragmatic to focus on on the 
countries where the new information is more likely to receive attention. As a result, we 
used a quasi-experiment with intentional treatment on North American and European 
countries, to resemble the randomized field experiment, considering the authors’ PR 
connections and promotional activities for our website. Quasi-experiments typically 
occur in real-world settings that more closely resemble the actual contexts and constraints 
faced by policymakers and practitioners. Although randomized experiments generally 
have better internal validity (evidence of causation), quasi-experiments often turn out to 
have better external validity (generalizability). 
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 3.3.1 Outgoing Spam 
Internet security is a very broad and general concept that has many dimensions. In 
the present article, we look into outgoing spam as one specific security issue. Referred to 
as unsolicited bulk emails, most spam messages are sent by botnets, a collection of 
compromised computers (bots), without the awareness of the legitimate computer 
owners. Anti-spam blocklists have spam traps scattered across the Internet and can 
recognize similar messages received at multiple locations. An estimated 88% of daily 
worldwide email traffic is spam. Inbound spam refers to the spam received, and many 
organizations are well equipped to filter spam out of incoming emails before these emails 
reach their employees or users. However, they have very limited techniques to prevent 
outbound spam originated from computers within the organizations. Outgoing spam is 
typically generated via zombie computers, compromised user accounts, or spammers who 
knowingly abuse their accounts (e.g., in snowshoe spam), and it is a common symptom of 
more damaging security problems. The same vulnerabilities that enable spam are also 
openings for other exploits. For example, miscreants can steal existing accounts by 
tricking end-users (through phishing or by human engineering) into providing their email 
usernames and passwords. Such stolen accounts can then be used to install botnet 
spamming malware or other exploits such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
software or sniffers, causing theft of customer records and intellectual property, 
fraudulent use of corporate online banking, or even employee blackmail. 
It is costly to deal with outbound spam, which often leads to major side effects 
such as IP blocking by RBL, DNSBL, and IP reputation systems. These side effects cause 
queue buildup on the affected mail server, delays in message delivery, and may result in 
lost messages and calls from unhappy end-users. They also lead to compromised user 
accounts and blocking of legitimate outbound email, which then cause damage to 
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reputation, customer relationship, business operation, and eventually lower profit. 
Unfortunately, conventional anti-spam measures may not work well for outbound traffic. 
Spam has an extreme negative externality in the sense that the ratio of external costs to 
private benefits is as high as 100:1, as compared with about 0.1 for pollution and 7:30 for 
nonviolent property crime (Rao and Reiley 2012).  
Therefore, if ISPs are constantly sending out spam, they not only risk being 
attacked themselves, but also increase the risk faced by other Internet users. In other 
words, the efforts of reducing outgoing spam can produce a remarkably large positive 
externality on other users. For instance, in 2011, Microsoft, Pfizer, FireEye network 
security, and security experts at the University of Washington collaborated to take down 
Rustock, the largest botnet on record. The takedown of this single botnet was followed by 
an immediate one-third reduction in global email spam (Rao and Reiley 2012). Hence, 
outgoing spam is a typical Internet security problem that lacks transparency, costs a lot to 
deal with, and generates negative externalities. If our approach proves effective in 
reducing outgoing spam, it can also be used for improving other security dimensions. 
3.3.2 SpamRankings.net 
We launched a website named SpamRankings.net in May 2011 and have since 
used it to release country-specific outbound spam information. This website serves as our 
main instrument to study public security information disclosure and presentation. It 
displays monthly outbound spam volume and rankings for sample organizations in the 
treated countries, including the United States, Canada, Belgium, and Turkey. To generate 
such information as treatment, we gathered and processed a large amount of daily spam 
data from two blocklists, the Composite Blocking List (CBL), and the Passive Spam 
Block List (PSBL). The CBL gathers its source data from very large mail server 
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installations and lists IPs exhibiting characteristics that are specific to open proxies of 
various sorts and dedicated Spam BOTs that have been abused to send spam, 
worms/viruses. The PSBL is an easy-on, easy-off blacklist that does not rely on testing 
and has a lower probability of false positives because any user can remove their ISP’s 
mail server from the list.  
The raw data include observed spamming IP addresses, corresponding outbound 
spam volume, and botnet tags in the forms of text files from CBL and Network News 
Transfer Protocol (NNTP) messages from PSBL. One important step in data processing is 
mapping IP addresses to netblocks and, subsequently, Autonomous Systems (ASes), 
which are groups of IP addresses owned by an organization. Organizations with very 
large networks may use multiple ASes as a way to divide their networks. Therefore, 
ASes, even within the same organization, are relatively independent of each other. 
Therefore we use ASes as the measurement level. An AS can be identified by a unique 
Autonomous System Number (ASN). Lastly, we aggregate the daily outbound spam data 
into monthly data and derive rankings for each country. We receive more than eight 
million records per day from CBL and PSBL, which we summarize into about two 
million spam messages observed from worldwide IP addresses. On the ASN level, we 
have seen 27,500 ASNs with spam volume over the lifespan of this project. The ASNs 
are then grouped and ranked by country. The Top 10 organizations with the most spam 
are listed on SpamRankings.net (Figure 3.1). For each Top 10 ASN, we display the 
following information: rank, rank in the previous month if it was listed in the previous 
month (“-” if not), name and website of the organization, ASN, and outgoing spam 
volume. 
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of SpamRankings.net 
3.3.3 Quasi-Experimental Design 
To evaluate the impact of spam information released on SpamRankings.net, we 
used a between-subjects quasi-experimental design with two conditions: the treatment 
with information released on SpamRankings.net every month, and the control with 
information kept internally. To strengthen social comparison and reputation concern, 
information released in the treatment condition is relative ranking with respect to the 
outgoing spam, which also means that the intervention is at the cluster, the country level. 
Individual ASN level assignment would have resulted in less meaningful ranking 
information and weaker social comparison. Therefore, we nested ASNs within countries 
and assigned countries as clusters of ASNs to the two conditions. Considering the 
publicity of SpamRankings.net, we specifically chose the United States, Canada, 
Belgium, and Turkey as four treatment countries. We then matched the treatment 
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countries with four control countries accordingly, based on population and total outgoing 
spam volume before our experiment, as shown in Table 3.1. Therefore, the control group 
consists of ASNs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands, and Iran. 
Table 3.1: Country Pairs 
Pair Country Population Spam* Group 
1 
United States (US) 310,232,863 57,176,031 treated 
Indonesia (ID) 242,968,342 94,435,116 control 
2 
Canada (CA) 33,679,000 4,387,388 treated 
Malaysia (MY) 28,274,729 6,695,830 control 
3 
Belgium (BE) 10,403,000 3,781,796 treated 
Netherlands (NL) 16,645,000 6,283,101 control 
4 
Turkey (TR) 77,804,122 14,759,146 treated 
Iran (IR) 76,923,300 13,291,908 control 
* All the data on spam in this chapter refer to the data on outbound 
spam 
   Spam data are taken from data for April 2011.  
For the treatment group, we made the monthly spam rankings available through 
SpamRankings.net from May 2011 to January 2012. We treated different countries with 
differing starting points in time, with the United States in May 2011, Canada in June 
2011, and Belgium and Turkey in July 2011. This sequential release was designed to 
accumulate publicity for our ranking site before getting into the full-scale experiment. 
For the control group, we did not publish any information on outbound spam, but the 
same data were collected and kept internally. We also collected static information on 
each AS, including number of IP addresses, number of unique IP addresses, number of 
prefixes, number of regions, network name, website, network type, traffic level, inbound 
versus outbound traffic ratio, and geographic scope. The primary outcome of interest is 
the outgoing spam volume. The sample ASes were included in either the treatment or 
control condition because they were observed to send out spam during May 2011 to 
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January 2012. Therefore, we have a selection bias toward ASes with more severe 
outgoing spam problems. In the specific context of the present study, this was not a 
problem since these ASes were the ones we intend to impact. All of the ASes remained 
through the entire experiment. 
Since we wanted to engage both organizations and consumers and observe their 
natural reactions, it was critical for the success of the experiment to accumulate sufficient 
visibility and attention of SpamRankings.net. We promoted the website through different 
channels, including social media such as YouTube, Twitter, and blogs, conferences, and 
press releases, to increase its impact. We also received much feedback and collaboration 
requests from industries and observed that some organizations had already tried to take 
their names off the list on SpamRankings.net. For example, we received the following 
comment from a Chief Security Officer of a medical center, which also confirms that 
some outgoing spam could be reduced using basic controls: 
The first time we were rated #1 on your list, we noticed that one of our users had 
generated thousands of spam messages and asked her to change her password—
that stopped the spam immediately. The next month, we found another user who 
had just given up her credentials and got her to change her password as well. I 
spoke with a colleague at one of the other medical centers ranked on your site and 
he mentioned they have the same problem…The listing on your site added 
additional impetus to make sure we ‘stay clean’ so in that regard, you are 
successful. 
3.4 Data 
We collected outbound spam data on the top 250 most spamming ASNs each 
month from March 2011 to January 2012 for the eight selected countries. Table 2 shows 
the summary statistics of observed sample ASNs by country. Only the United States had 
over 250 spammers for some months, but the top 250 ASNs accounted for over 95% of 
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the total outbound spam. The total unique sample size was 1,718 ASNs, with 1,177 ASNs 
in the treated group and 541 ASNs in the control group. However, if we look at the 
average number of ASNs with observed outgoing spam per month, we have a more 
balanced treatment group and control group. The unbalance is the result of the 
observation that spamming ASNs for the treatment group varied significantly from month 
to month, indicating that ASNs in the treatment group reduced their outbound spam more 
quickly than those in the control group. Results for average maximum of spam 
percentage by ASN show that a few ASNs were responsible for the most outbound spam 
volume in Indonesia, Turkey, Belgium, and Malaysia. Especially for Indonesia, the most 
spamming ASN sent out 83.46% of total spam on average. However, for the United 
States, the most spamming ASN accounted for only 6.89% of total spam on average.  
 
Table 3.2: Observed Sample ASNs by Country 
 
Number 
of ASNs 
Average number of ASNs 
with positive spam volume 
per month 
Average max of 
spam volume by 
ASN 
Average max of 
spam percentage by 
ASN 
Treated     
US 699 250 3,414,080 6.89% 
CA 316 175 1,261,576 20.94% 
BE 56 31 1,116,462 44.70% 
TR 106 63 5,051,160 48.08% 
Sum 1177 519   
Control     
ID 229 190 45,903,492 83.46% 
MY 57 44 1,958,958 43.11% 
NL 170 101 1,067,763 22.91% 
IR 85 77 2,575,711 27.89% 
Sum 541 413   
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Table 3.3 Outgoing Spam Volume Observed Per Month Per Country 
 Pretest Period* Test Period* Difference Percentage 
Treated group     
US 105,347,424 33,007,389 72,340,035 68.67% 
CA 7,786,736 3,949,362 3,837,374 49.28% 
BE 3,812,537 1,663,925 2,148,612 56.36% 
TR 14,758,174 8,052,961 6,705,213 45.43% 
Average 32,926,218 11,668,409 21,257,809 54.93% 
Control group     
ID 93,416,115 46,320,078 47,096,037 50.42% 
MY 6,361,998 3,684,334 2,677,663 42.09% 
NL 7,261,624 2,086,952 5,174,672 71.26% 
IR 10,590,092 8,515,070 2,075,021 19.59% 
Average 29,407,457 15,151,609 14,255,848 45.84% 
*For US, the pretest period is 3/2011-4/2011; the test period is 5/2011-1/2012. 
  For CA, the pretest period is 3/2011-5/2011; the test period is 6/2011-1/2012. 
  For other countries, the pretest period is 03/2011-06/2011; the test period is 7/2011-1/2012. 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the outbound spam volume by country for both the periods 
before (Pretest Period) and during (Test Period) the experiment. This comparison 
presents the average outbound spam volume per month and the difference. On average, 
the outbound spam volume of the four countries in the treated group dropped by 54.93%, 
whereas the number for the four countries in the control group was 45.84%. 
3.5 Statistical Models 
We estimate a linear model to test the effect of security information disclosure. 
First, we employ a simple difference specification to directly compare the treatment and 
control groups: 
Y
ict
= θ
0
 + θ
1
D
c 
+ ε
ict  ,      (3.1) 
where the dependent variable Y
ict
 is the outcome of interest for AS i in country c at time t 
during the experimental period, and D
c
 is an treatment indicator variable for whether 
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country c received security information disclosure, which remains invariant during 
experiment period for country c. Hence, the estimate of the coefficient θ
1
 indicates the 
difference between treatment and control countries. We utilize this model to compare 
baseline differences in pre-treatment conditions and to test the effect of spam information 
disclosure on firms’ outbound spam. 
Since the assignment of countries to treatment and control groups is not random 
in the present study, the outbound spam is likely to be affected by pre-treatment 
conditions. It is thus necessary to include observable AS characteristics and baseline 
spam volumes as control variables in (3.1) to improve the precision of the estimated 
treatment effect. Therefore, we also estimate the following specification: 
Y
ict
= θ
0
 + θ
1
D
c 
+ θ
2
X
ic
 + ω
p
 + ε
ict ,     (3.2) 
where Y
ict
 and D
c
 are defined as in (3.1), and X
ic
 is a vector of pre-treatment AS 
characteristics including baseline spam volume and number of IP addresses. Since the 
assignment to treatment and control groups was stratified within country pairs (Table 
3.1), we also include country pair fixed effects, ω
p
, in (3.2).  
We also examine whether the treatment effect interacts with baseline AS 
characteristics by including interactive terms: 
Y
ict
= θ
0
 + θ
1
D
c 
+ θ
2
X
ic
 + θ3Dc * Xic + ωp + εict ,         (3.3) 
where the interactive term D
c 
* X
ic
  is added based on (3.2). The estimate of θ3 captures 
the part of treatment effect moderated by baseline AS characteristics. 
Outbound spam volumes from organizations within a country may be correlated 
because of common policies and regulations for a country. These country-clustered 
missing variables would result in highly positively correlated error terms. Failure to 
correct for the correlation could result in underestimated standard errors and thus 
overestimated treatment effects (Bertrand et al. 2004). We therefore use cluster-robust 
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standard errors at the country level (the level of treatment assignment) in estimation of all 
of the above models to allow for both error heteroskedasticity and flexible within-cluster 
error correlation. However, the asymptotic justification based on cluster-robust standard 
errors assumes that the number of clusters goes to infinity.  With few (five to 30) clusters, 
cluster-robust standard errors can still be understated (Cameron et al., 2008). Since we 
have only eight clusters (eight countries), this problem is likely to exist. So we further use 
the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) to adjust the 
estimated standard errors for θ1 in our main models (3.2)). 
3.6 Baseline Comparison 
Since assigning firms into treatment and control groups is not random, it is 
necessary to test the difference in pre-treatment conditions that may be correlated with 
the outbound spam. If the difference is not statistically significant, then any differences in 
post-intervention outcomes between the two groups can be causally attributed to the 
intervention. Otherwise, the pre-treatment difference needs to be controlled in order to 
make a precise estimation on treatment effect. To check whether firm characteristics were 
similar or not between the two groups, we run regressions of the number of IP addresses 
and pre-treatment baseline spam volume (average spam volume for March and April 
2012) on treatment status using (3.1). 
We present the comparison of firms at baseline in Table 3.4. Column 1 contains 
the average characteristics for the control group. Columns 2 and 3 present the estimated 
differences between the treatment and control groups. The results in column 2 do not 
include any controls, whereas those in column 3 control for country pair fixed effects. 
The differences in average baseline spam and IP number are statistically significant and 
large in magnitude. Specifically, the organizations in the treatment group generated about 
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50% less spam than those in the control group before the treatment.  On average, the 
organizations in the treatment group also have about four times more IP addresses than 
those in the control group. Both two variables are likely to be correlated with post-
treatment outbound spam. 
Table 3.4  Baseline Comparison 
 
Control Mean 
 
(1) 
Treatment Difference 
No Controls 
(2) 
Treatment Difference 
Country Pair FE 
(3) 
     Baseline spam 218439 -106540 
(111622) 
-152449** 
(57470) 
     IP number 140495 647773* 
(327720) 
625859* 
(277616) 
Observations 540 1717 1717 
Notes. Column 1 contains the average characteristic of the organizations in the control 
countries. Columns 2 and 3 contain estimates of the average difference in characteristics 
between the control and treatment organizations, without controls and with controls for 
country pair fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and 
shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. 
3.7 Information Disclosure Effect 
The estimation of the effect of information disclosure is based on comparing the 
outgoing spam volumes of the treatment group and the control group, according to (3.1) 
and (3.2). The results are presented in Table 3.5. Column (1) displays the results from the 
basic model in (3.1), where only treatment indicator is included. It shows that although 
the treatment organizations sent out less spam than the control organizations, the 
difference is statistically insignificant. However, once we control for country pair fixed 
effect, the difference becomes significant and also increases in magnitude (Column (2)).  
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Table 3.5: Effect of Information Disclosure 
 
(1) 
Basic model 
 
 
(2) 
Basic model 
+Country pair FE 
 
(3) 
Basic model  
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls 
(4) 
Basic model 
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls 
 Spam Spam Spam Ln(Spam) 
Constant 121248* 
(52992) 
163213*** 
(31879) 
-1274 
(4250) 
6.4448*** 
(0.3441) 
Treatment -81393 
(53820) 
-103197** 
(30849) 
-17757** 
(4076) 
-2.8197*** 
(0.3669) 
Baseline spam 
  
0.4922*** 
(0.0160) 
0.0000003 
(0.0000002) 
IP number 
  
-0.0058*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0000002*** 
(0.00000002) 
Significance level using wild  bootstrap-t 0.002 0.002 
Observations 14255 14255 14248 14248 
Notes. Column 1 displays the estimate of treatment effect on outgoing spam using the basic model 
without controls (3.1)). Column 2 reports the result controlling for country pair fixed effects. Column 3 
controls for country pair fixed effects, baseline spam volume, and the number of IP addresses. Column 
4 reports the estimate of treatment effect on log transformed outgoing spam controlling for country 
pair fixed effects, baseline spam volume, and the number of IP addresses. All standard errors are 
clustered by country and shown in parentheses. Row significance level using bootstrap-t reports the 
significance level for the estimate of treatment effect in Column 3. * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
As suggested by Table 3.1, the treatment organizations significantly differ from 
the control organizations in terms of baseline spam and number of IP addresses. 
Therefore, in addition to country pair fixed effect, Column 3 also controls for baseline 
spam volume and number of IP addresses and contains the main results. It is not 
surprising that both baseline spam volume and the number of IP addresses significantly 
affect post-treatment outbound spam. Baseline spam volume is positively correlated with 
spam volume during the treatment period, indicating the persistence of certain security 
vulnerabilities. Unless the subject organization takes efforts to deal with these 
vulnerabilities, it will be continuously exploited by malicious attackers. The number of IP 
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addresses is found to be negatively correlated with outgoing spam volume, suggesting 
that large systems tend to have less vulnerability. On the one hand, large systems provide 
attackers with more opportunities. On the other hand, large systems are likely to invest 
more in Internet security. Our finding suggests that the later force dominates the former.  
Controlling for baseline spam and number of IP addresses drops the estimate of 
treatment effect by approximately 80% from 103,197 to 17,757, suggesting that the 
baseline spam and number of IP addresses explain a substantial part of variation in post-
treatment outbound spam. Nevertheless, the treatment effect remains significant and 
sizable even with controls for the two characteristics. Given that the average outgoing 
spam volume for the treatment group is 111,899, the size of this effect is estimated at 
approximately 15.9%. Romanosky et al. (2011) found that the adoption of data breach 
disclosure laws can reduce identity theft caused by data breaches by 6.1% on average. 
Although the two findings are consistent, the comparison suggests that public information 
disclosure is more effective than notifying only those who have been affected.   
Considering the small number of clusters, we use the wild cluster bootstrap-t 
procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) to further test the treatment effect estimate. 
The bootstrap result shows that the estimate is robust to such asymptotic refinement. In 
addition, to test whether the estimate is subject to the functional specification of the 
statistical model, we take log transformation of spam volume, which smooths out the 
skewness in the distribution of spam, and run the same estimation again. According to the 
results presented in column (4), the treatment effect becomes even more significant 
statistically. Therefore, we can safely arrive at the conclusion that public disclosure of 
outbound spam does help reduce outbound spam. 
To examine how the treatment effect dynamically changes as the treatment 
proceeds, we run the estimation for each month of the treatment period separately, 
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controlling for country pair fixed effects, baseline spam, and the number of IP addresses. 
The results for all seven months of the treatment period are presented in Table 3.6. 
Throughout the entire period, the estimates of treatment effect are consistent and increase 
in magnitude, which provides additional support for our conclusion. 
Table 3.6: Effect of Information Disclosure by Time 
 
(1) 
1 month 
(2) 
2 months 
(3) 
3 months 
(4) 
4 months 
(5) 
5 months 
(6) 
6 months 
(7) 
7 months 
Constant 7429 
(6124) 
-10282* 
(4505) 
-9821 
(5828) 
-7308 
(5405) 
-2276 
(8665) 
-6402 
(7918) 
9327* 
(4323) 
Treatment -15476* 
(7296) 
-10843* 
(5229) 
-14734** 
(5925) 
-26353*** 
(4257) 
-36988** 
(9620) 
-18685 
(12003) 
-13304** 
(4541) 
Baseline 
spam 
0.3049*** 
(0.0043) 
0.5125*** 
(0.0140) 
0.4725*** 
(0.0141) 
0.5256*** 
(0.0160) 
0.7260*** 
(0.0332) 
0.7520*** 
(0.0342) 
0.3799*** 
(0.0103) 
IP number 0.0012 
(0.0012) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0035** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0045** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0131** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0051*** 
(0.0006) 
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 
Notes. Columns 1 to 7 display the estimates for the first to seventh month after the treatment. Country pair 
fixed effects, baseline spam, and number of IP addresses are included in all estimations. Standard errors 
are clustered by country and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Then, we allow the treatment effect to interact with pre-treatment characteristics 
to see whether the effect will differ on different organizations. Table 3.7 presents the 
results. Column (1) simply displays the main results from column 3 of Table 3.5 without 
any interaction as a benchmark for comparison. Columns (2) and (3) present the results 
allowing the treatment effect to interact with baseline spam volume and the number of IP 
addresses, respectively. Column (4) presents the results allowing the treatment effect to 
interact with the baseline rank, which is the spam ranking among all organizations in the 
same country at the time one month before treatment. Column (5) presents the results 
allowing the treatment effect to interact with baseline top10, which is a binary indicator 
for whether the organization ranked top 10 among all organizations in the same country 
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at one month before treatment. Country pair fixed effects, baseline spam, and number of 
IP addresses are included in all columns.  
Table 3.7: Interaction Effect of Information Disclosure 
 
(1) 
No Interaction 
 
(2) 
Interact with 
baseline spam 
(3) 
Interact with 
IP number 
(4) 
Interact with 
baseline rank 
(5) 
Interact with 
baseline top10 
Constant -1274 
(4250) 
-1478 
(2363) 
-1746 
(2945) 
-49205* 
(23181) 
-9727 
(10995) 
D
c
 -17757** 
(4076) 
10656 
(9605) 
-17091*** 
(2791) 
-86068 
(47539) 
-4212 
(13915) 
Baseline spam 0.4922*** 
(0.0160) 
0.5027*** 
(0.0006) 
0.4919*** 
(0.0166) 
0.4942*** 
(0.0133) 
0.4944*** 
(0.0128) 
IP number -0.0058*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0007) 
-0.0002 
(0.0193) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0049*** 
(0.0007) 
D
c
* Baseline spam 
 
-0.2524** 
(0.0776) 
   
D
c
* IP number 
  
-0.0057 
(0.0191) 
  
Baseline rank 
   
244.2** 
(89.05) 
 
D
c
* Baseline rank 
   
-336.6 
(217.7) 
 
Baseline top10 
    
7820 
(90440) 
D
c
* Baseline top10 
    
-294164 
(294193) 
Observations 14248 14248 14248 14248 14248 
Notes. Column 1 displays the main results without any interaction effect from column 3 of Table 5 for 
comparison. Columns 2 and 3 present the results allowing the treatment effect to interact with baseline 
spam volume and number of IP addresses respectively. Column 4 and 5 present the results allowing the 
treatment effect to interact with the baseline rank and baseline top10 respectively. Country pair fixed 
effects, baseline spam, and number of IP addresses are included in all estimations. Standard errors are 
clustered by country and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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According to these results, the treatment effect does not interact with pre-
treatment characteristics expect for baseline spam volume. The significant negative 
coefficient (-0.2524) for D
c
* Baseline spam shows that information disclosure is more 
effective on organizations with more baseline spam. Although we listed only the top 20 
spamming organizations, organizations currently off the list were also encouraged to take 
effort to remain that way. However, when public disclosure was imposed, organizations 
with severe outgoing spam problem had stronger incentives to deal with the problem to 
reduce reputation loss. This could have been partially because of the specific presentation 
we used in the present study, that we disclosed the worst behavior instead of advocating 
the best practice. 
Since the data we used were collected repeatedly for the same sample for many 
months, the outcome may be serially correlated, and the resulting standard errors may be 
inconsistent. Besides bootstrap, Bertrand et al. (2004) proposed that the correction that 
collapses the time series information into a “pre”- and “post”-period can explicitly take 
into account the effective sample size. Using this method as an additional robustness 
check, we collapse our data into a pre-treatment and a post-treatment period by taking the 
average of spam volume for the months before the treatment and the months with 
treatment for each sample AS. Then we run the statistical model using the collapsed data. 
The results (in Table 3.8) are consistent with the results using original data.  
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Table 3.8: Information Disclosure Effect Using Average Spam Volume for Pre- and Post-
Treatment Periods 
 
(1) 
Basic model 
 
 
(2) 
Basic model 
+Country pair FE 
 
(3) 
Basic model  
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls 
 Post-spam Post-spam Post-spam 
Constant 112267* 
(53094) 
157823*** 
(34448) 
-1694 
(4138) 
Treatment -72612 
(53993) 
-96041** 
(32421) 
-17333*** 
(4261) 
Pre-spam   
0.4928*** 
(0.0158) 
IP number   
-0.0058*** 
(0.0006) 
Observations 1718 1718 1718 
Notes. Standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
3.8 Social Comparison Effect 
As we showed in the previous section, information disclosure does positively 
encourage organizations to reduce outgoing spam. Although we release information only 
on the top-most spamming organizations, the disclosure has a positive spillover effect on 
organizations that are currently off the list. The disclosure effect mainly comes from the 
concern for reputation loss; that is, the more spam an organization sends out, the more 
likely it will be listed on SpamRankings.net. Another force that would potentially affect 
organizations’ behavior is the social comparison effect caused by the information of other 
organizations’ behavior. The important information on others’ behavior released on our 
website is the maximum spam volume observed from the most spamming AS (referred to 
as Max spam) and the minimum listed spam volume observed from the AS that ranked 
10th in the treatment country (referred to as Min spam). According to social comparison 
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theory (Festinger 1954), organizations will react to the specific information disclosed as 
well as to the disclosure mechanism in that organizations have the tendency to behave in 
consistency with others. Therefore, in addition to the treatment variable, we add two 
variables, Treatment*Max spam and Treatment*Min spam, to test whether treatment 
organizations will react to the specific information disclosed on other organizations. 
Table 3.9 Impact of Specific Information Disclosed 
 
(1) 
Basic model  
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls  
 
(2) 
Basic model  
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls  
(3) 
Basic model  
+ Country pair FE 
+Controls 
 Spam Spam Spam  
Constant 353.3 
(5172) 
-44.00 
(5041) 
375.0 
(5271) 
Treatment -24601*** 
(6320) 
-17514** 
(7266) 
-24922** 
(7375) 
Baseline spam 0.4899*** 
(0.0177) 
0.4899*** 
(0.0177) 
0.4899*** 
(0.0177) 
IP number -0.0066*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0014) 
Treatment*Max spam 0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
 0.0002** 
(0.00008) 
Treatment*Min spam  -0.0051 
(0.0114) 
0.0007 
(0.0096) 
Observations 14248 14248 14248 
Notes. Standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.9 shows the results after including these two additional variables. The 
coefficients indicate how the specific information would modify the treatment effect. We 
find that organizations react only to the specific Max spam, not the Min spam, meaning 
that they pay attention only to the worst spam sending behavior but not to the mediocre 
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behavior. The coefficient estimate of Treatment*Max spam is positive, suggesting that 
the more outgoing spam observed from the worst behavior, the less likely organizations 
will be to take effort to improve their own behavior. In other words, it shows that if even 
the worst behavior is not so bad, organizations will have more pressure or desire to 
improve themselves. This finding is consistent with the prediction by social comparison 
process, during which individuals evaluate themselves against others and the existence of 
a discrepancy leads to actions toward reducing it.  
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
Governments, businesses, and consumers are constantly exposed to the risk of 
cybercrime. Our society has recognized the need for additional laws and co-operation to 
protect consumer privacy, enterprise assets, intellectual property, and critical national 
infrastructure. In the thriving and fast-moving discipline of Internet security, many are 
searching for technical solutions such as firewall and antivirus software. We propose that 
Internet security needs to be improved from the perspective of fundamental motivations. 
Systems are prone to failure when the person guarding them is not the person who suffers 
when they fail (Anderson and Moore 2006). An organization’s security vulnerabilities are 
also shared by other organizations but are often kept private. The negative externality 
gives Internet security the feature of partial public good. The private provision of public 
goods often results in underinvestment because of the lack of incentives. In social 
psychology, the underinvestment problem is often addressed through making relevant 
social information available and soliciting social comparison process.  
Drawing upon social comparison theory, we propose a social information 
provision to encourage organizations to improve their Internet security. The information 
disclosure mechanism can incur concern for reputation loss, whereas the specific 
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information disclosed can incur a social comparison. Through making information on 
other organizations’ behavior publicly available, we aimed to solicit the comparison 
among them and impose reputation loss on those who do not behave pro-socially. To 
dose up the comparison, we disclosed the relative rankings for all of the organizations in 
a country in addition to absolute performance and listed the top 10 worst organizations by 
their standings. Such “shame” lists make bad behaviors notorious. Using a field quasi-
experiment on outgoing spam for 1,718 ASes in eight countries, we show that providing 
social information on outgoing spam encouraged the treatment organizations to reduce it 
by approximately 15.9%. As compared with an existing study (Romanosky et al. 2011), 
which documented a 6.1% effect of adopting data breach disclosure laws on identity 
theft, this result shows that making social information publicly available is more effective 
than notifying only affected consumers in motivating desirable pro-social behavior.  
We find a positive spillover effect in that even though only the top 10 worst 
organizations are listed, such listing incentivizes both listed and unlisted organizations. 
However, the impact is stronger on organizations with more spam. The number of IP 
addresses is found to be negatively correlated with outgoing spam volume. The number 
of IP addresses measures the size of the AS. On the one hand, large ASes have more 
incentives to invest in Internet security because of economies of scale. On the other hand, 
large ASes have more exploitable opportunities for hackers. The result indicates the 
former dominates the latter. A closer look at the social comparison process reveals that 
the more outgoing spam observed from the worst spammer, the less likely an 
organization will be to improve its own behavior. This finding again reflects that 
improving Internet security requires collective work of all organizations and that 
individual behavior can generate strong positive externalities on others. We can utilize 
the desire for information on others’ behavior and use of the information for self-
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evaluation to intervene in individual organizations’ security decisions and solicit the 
desirable behavior. 
Our present study has implications for information architecture design and public 
policy making. With the ubiquity of Internet, the things that people do online can be 
tracked, providing an abundance of data. The question we currently face is not the lack of 
data but how to make use of the data available. Online users care about their popularity, 
reputation, and social status within the community. If we can capture users’ actions, 
aggregate and display the relevant information, and provide the right feedback as the 
right intervention at the right time, we can lead their behaviors in our intended direction. 
With respect to public policy, our present work is among the few empirical studies on 
Internet security using security vulnerabilities data. Policy makers have hesitated to use 
security information disclosure for a long time. Although a fierce argument has been 
observed surrounding disclosure, little attention has been paid to information display or 
presentation. We believe what is more important than disclosure is whether the 
information is easy for users to interpret and compare. In the present study, we used 
relative rankings to enhance the disclosure effect. For policy evaluation, more 
information presentation methods can be considered and compared before carrying out 
the policy extensively. Field experimentation provides an efficient and effective method 
to evaluate potential policies beforehand. The same approach applies to other security, 
social, or environmental problems such as energy conservation and pollution. In the case 
where data is not available, the legislation that requires mandatory reporting can be 
employed to collect data. 
Our present article is only our first step in studying Internet security and relevant 
public policy issues from social psychology and economics perspectives. We are 
planning to further extend the present study in several dimensions. First, we 
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experimented only with ranking information in our study to focus on relative standing. To 
identify the exact effect of using ranking information versus absolute volume 
information, a new treatment group can be added by which organizations receive 
information only on absolute outbound spam volume with organizations listed 
alphabetically. With the established visibility of SpamRankings.net, we can experiment 
with more countries, more industries, and more treatment conditions. Second, the 
observation of reduction in outgoing spam may or may not reflect the improvement in 
overall Internet security. If overall Internet security improves while spam decreases, it 
indicates that companies take the initiative to improve their overall information security, 
affecting both vulnerability to spam and other threats such as phishing. This would mean 
that broad improvements in information security can be achieved by presenting public 
information on certain security issues. It is also possible that in response to public 
information disclosure of outbound spam, organizations may take effort to address only 
outbound spam issue but will still ignore other security problems. If this happens, it 
means that companies instead need to be individually incentivized to make improvements 
on individual dimensions of security. As a result, we can encourage companies to make 
anti-spam improvements by releasing social information on spam. However, to encourage 
companies to prevent phishing, we need to also release phishing information. With 
phishing data in addition to spam data, we can distinguish these two possibilities by 
exploring their correlations. In addition, we can drill down outgoing spam to botnets or 
snowshoe spammers to consider attackers’ reactions to information disclosure. 
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Appendix:   Proof of Results in Chapter 2 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
 
Proof.        From (2.2), we can obtain: 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2 
 
Proof.        From (2.2), we can obtain: 
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where the inequality follows from the sufficiently large positive surprise, (     
  ). 
Thus, we have: 
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As a result, when the positive surprise is sufficiently large, we can show that 
 
    
           . Part (b) can be proved similarly.   
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